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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Since World War II, billions of dollars in government subsidies have 
been dispersed to veterans for the purpose of furthering their educations. 
'lhree programs designed to aid veterans of WWII, Korea, and the post-
Korean era respectively were implemented to "provide vocational readjust-
ment and to restore educational opportunities lost due to service in the 
Armed Forces" (26, p. 19). Those veterans return:ilng to college faced 
somewhat lower private rates of return on educational investment than 
before their service due to a shortened time span over which benefits 
would accrue. But more importantly in the minds of Congress, there 
would be increased difficulty for the veteran in financing a college 
education due to the facts that: (1) younger brothers and sisters were 
now of college age, thereby placing additional strain on family budgets; 
and (2) many veterans now had families of their own to support. A third 
goal of "making service in the Armed Forces more attractive" (26, p. 19) 
was included in the supporting rationale for the post-Korean (Vietnam 
Era) CI Bill. 
The WWH GI Bill of Rights covered veterans with service between 
September 16, 1940, and July 25, 1947. The Korean Conflict legislation 
applied to veterans who served between June 27, 1950, and 
January 11, 1955; while the post-Korean Bill became effective 
1 
June 1, 1966. 1he eligibility period for the· latter extended through 
1 December 31, 1976. 
'fhe Korean and post-Korean GI Bills differed from the WWII GI Bill 
in that the former were true voucher systems. Payments, varying only 
2 
according to the number of dependents, were made directly to the veteran; 
whereas under the WWII Bill, direct costs (tuition, fees, books) to a 
maximum of $500 annually were paid to the colleges by the Veterans 
Administration.. An additional subsistence allowance of $50 a month was 
paid to the veteran under the WWII Bill. 
There is a general consensus among those writing on the subject of 
GI Bill educational benefits that benefit availability has significantly 
increased the educational attainment of veterans. The proposed relation-
1 . 
ship between benefit avilability and post-service attainment has firm 
foundations in human capital theory. Previous attempts to verify the 
relationship empirically have suffered from data constraints which pro-
hibited investigators from accurately gauging the nature and strength 
of any correlation. 
The initial purpose of this thesis is to use human capital theory 
to develop hypotheses which will, in turn, permit an assessment o.f any 
influence benefit availability has on educational investment by veterans. 
The second purpose is to empirically test those hypotheses by multiple 
regression analysis of data relating to the educational attainment of 
veterans. 
Chapter II presents a review of past literature dealing specifically 
with the influence of GI Bill benefits on educational investment. The 
1The magnitude of these programs and the increasingly larger propor-
tion of participal'\ts who have used the benefits to support training at the 
college level can be determined from (Table V, Appendix A). 
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principal shortcoming of prior studies is the unavailability of a 
control group with which to compare the attainment of veterans having 
GI Bill benefits. Consequently, the majority of these studies rely 
excluslvcly on data drawn from hypothetical questionnaires submitted 
to veterans. Their conclusions must, therefore, be viewed with 
considerable caution. 
The thesis proceeds with an investigation of human capital theory 
in Chapter III. Tenets are derived from the literature in order to 
develop a theoretical model in Chapter IV which identifies the nature 
of the relationship be tween benefit avilabili ty and educational invest-
ment by all veterans. The model also predicts the relative influence 
of benefit availability on investment by groups of veterans differentiated 
according to their socioeconomic backgrounds. 
Hypotheses are formulated in Chapter V to test the predictability 
of the theoretical model and assess the influence of benefit availability 
on investment decisions by: (1) all veterans, and (2) racial sub groupings 
of veterans. The hypotheses evaluated are: 
1. Availability of the GI Bill educational benefits has increased 
the post-service college educational attainment of veterans. 
2. The GI Bill educational henefi ts have caused a greater increase 
in post-service college educational attainment for black 
veterans than for nonblack veterans. 
'!he hypotheses are tested by applying a stepwise multiple regression 
technique to data recounting the post-service educational attainment of 
Korean and post-Korean veterans. The data are drawn from a survey 
conducted in 1967 by the Bureau of the Census on behalf of the Veterans 
Administration. 'Ihe survey is a stratified area sample selected from 
the Bureau's Current Population Survey/Monthly Labor Survey (CPS/MLS) 
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sample of October, 1966. The survey contai.ns data on veterans whose 
periods of military service ranged from the Spanish-American War through 
1966. Responses were secured from 11,839 veterans. 1he copy of the 
data tape employed in the present study was obtained from the Center 
for Human Resources Research of the Ohio State University. 
1he completed survey questionnaires provide detailed information 
on education, income, and other personal characteristics. Specific 
information is contained regarding the amount of education acquired 
between sep~ration and the survey date. Post-service attainment is 
categorized according to the number of months acquired with and without 
GI B i.11 assistance • 
The present study restricts attention to the data relating to 
I 
Korean and post-Korean veterans only. The Korean and post-Korean 
veterans differed systematically in that the Korean veterans.were 
eligible for GI Bill benefits while the post-Korean veterans did not 
become eligible until June, 1966. Restricting the analysis to include 
Korean and post-Korean veterans only insures that all characteristics 
other than benefit availability are as similar as possible among members 
of the sample group. 
Multiple regression analysi.s allows the researcher to determine 
whether or not suggested variables are significant in explaining the 
behavi.or of a dependent variable. The number of months of post-service 
education attained by veterans in the sample group is specified as the 
dependent variable in the regression model. Nine potential explanatory 
variables, including one representing the availability of GI Bill 
benefi. ts, are entered into the regression equation one at a time. 1he 
stepwlst~ tt•ehnlqut~ employed retains only those vadables which signifi-
cantly increase _the explanatory value of the equation. 
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The veterans in the sample are then divided into two groups~- blacks 
and nonblacks. 'lbe black group serves as a proxy for those veterans 
evolving frern relatively disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds. 
Separate regressions are run on each group. 'Ibis facilitates a 
detennlnati.on of the relative influence of the suggested variables on 
each group. An evaluation of the regression results is conducted in 
Uiapter VI, •and the conclusions of the thesis are presented in Chapter 
VIL 
'Jbe approach of the thesis offers several advantages over the 
rnethod,ology of previous studies. Fir~t, a theore1ical model is developed, 
based upon human capital literature, that yields direct implications 
regarding the influence of benefit availability on veterans' educational 
investment decisions. Second, a data base is developed that permits an 
. empirical evaluation of the theoretical implications of the model. The 
testing procedure focuses on the actual investment behavior of two groups 
of veterans ,whose primary difference is the fact that one group had 
benefits av~ilable while the other did not. 
111e application of multiple regression techniques to actual invest-
ment data allows conclusions regarding the significance of benefit 
availability to be drawn with a specified degree of statisti,cal confi-
dence. Previous studies;, based upon hypothetical questionilaires · .. 
distributed_ to studen.t veterans, are unable to do this •. 
6 
An empirical determination of the influence of benefit availability 
2 is especially important now that these benefits are being phased out. 
'llle theoretical model developed in Chapter IV suggests that the avail-
ability of benefits is particularly important in influencing the invest-
ment decisions of individuals from relatively disadvantaged socioeconomic 
backgrounds. It follows that these same individuals will suffer a 
<lisproporl:lonate burden if benefits are withdrawn without government 
imp1emen tation of other program.q designed to provide aid in financing 
higher education. 
'Ibe extension and modification of the Basic Educational Opportunity 
Grants (BEOG) program in October, 1978, marks a major effort by the 
federal government to provide financial assistanc~ to individuals 
seeking college level education. An empirical evaluation of the 
significance of the GI Bill in raising educational attainment by socio-
economically disadvantaged veterans yields important implications 
regarding the probable impact of the BEOG program. 3 
2veterans entering the service after December 31, 1976, are not 
eligible to receive benefits under the Vietnam Era GI Bill. Inductees 
after this ~ate do have the option of setting aside between fifty and 
seventy-five dollars of their 100nthly pay in an educational assistance 
fund. The Veterans Administration will then match every dollar contri-
buted with two dollars in federal funds, with the stipulation that the 
money be applied toward tuition and expenses incurred while the veteran 
ls· enrolled in an educational or training program. 
3The primary differences between the GI Bill educational benefits 
program and the BEOG program are: (1) the BEOG program is not restricted 
to veterans, and (2) the level of payments under the BEOG program is 
inversely related to the level of family income. 'llle 1978 modifications 
extended eligibility upward to include students from families earning 
as much as $25 ,000 annually. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE ON THE GI BILL 
In spite of the massive expenditures made under the GI Bill educa-
tional programs ( $5. 7 billion in fiscal 1976 alone [24, p. 166]), very 
few empirical investigations of the GI Bill(s) have been conducted. lhe 
first studies were the product of social psychologists, interested in 
assessing the adjustment of veterans to college life, and their relative 
academic performance (4, p. 3). Norman Frederiksen and W. B. Schrader 
I 
(5), and R • .J. Strom (20) conducted surveys of college WWII veterans in 
which the veterans were asked whether they would have attended college 
had the subsidy not been available. The response in both surveys was 
that some 20% of the veterans would not have attended without the 
subsidy •1 
In 1956, the President's Commission on Veterans' Pensions (the 
Bradley Commission) published twelve volumes of staff reports reviewing 
all federal programs established to provide benefits for veterans. The 
study was largely based on a survey of 7,900 veterans performed by the 
Census Bureau in October, 1955. However, the ability to draw definitive 
conclusions about the success of such readjustment programs as the GI 
Bill educational benefits is severely constrained because most of the data 
combine WWII and Korean veterans. 
1 Twenty percent in Frederiksen (5), and 22% in Strom (20). 
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Since Korean Confl:ict veterans have not yet had time to 
realize the (full) benefits of post-war training, the 
combined totals tend to understate the success in 
readjustment that has been achieved by the WWI· group 
(25, P• 108). 
Another Census Bureau survey conducted in the same year (1955) 
showed that annual earnings for those veterans who had returned to 
school under the GI Bill were approximately the same as those veterans 
. 2 ~ho had not returned 'to school (14, p. 147). In spite of these 
results, most of those writing on the subject of GI Bill educational 
benefits remained convinced that the net impact of the benefits on 
educational levels and earnings was in fact significant. H. P. Miller 
concluded that the results of the latter Census Bureau survey suffered 
from the same bias confronted in the Bradley Cotmnission study: i.e., 
"conceivably the full impact of ,the additional trMning was not yet 
reflected in 1955" (14, p. 147). 
Another problem inherent in both surveys is that no allowance is 
8 
made for differences in ability, educational level, or social background. 
Thra:inn. Eggertsson ( 4, p. 9) correctly concludes that comparisons. of 
incomes or occupational distributions of veterans and nonveterans reveal 
little of interest when no allowance is made for other explanatory 
factors. 
A few authors, especially C. B. Nam (15), remained unconvinced of 
the effectiveness of the GI Bill in raising educational attainment. In 
an artlcle published in 1964, Nam concluded that the impact of the GI 
Bills on the educational levels of the male population was insignificant 
(pp. 26-32). It was his judgment that even though war interrupts the 
2 Veterans who returned to school had average annual earnings of 
$4 ,400, vs. $4 ,200 for veterans who had not returned to school after 
separation. 
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educational investment plans of many individuals, these same individuals 
retun1 to school after the war and complete, on average, the same amount 
of Bchooling as the typical individual who did not join the service. 
Nam (15) relied heavily on data contained in the Bradley Commission 
Report, to which he initially. applied the 20% difference in educational 
enrollment by veterans due to benefit availability previously estimated 
by F'rederiksert and Schrader. He finds that a "subs tan ti al minority of 
the veterans who at tended college after the war would not have attended 
if the GI Bills had not been available" (p. 28). He contends, however, 
that many of the enrollees did not increase their educational attainment 
when measured ~s "completed years of formal schooling leading toward a 
diploma or degree (p. 29). Drawing on the Bradley data and other 
3 
sources, he concludes that: 
. • • even if the benefits of the GI education and training 
programs had not been available, the sharply rising trend 
in formal educational composition of the male population 
observed before the war would have continued at substantially 
the same general level (p. 32). 
The estimate Nam derives of the educational attainment resulting 
from the availability of benefits may contain a downward bias if: 
(1) data from the Bradley Commission Report do not fully reflect the 
total increment in attainment for veterans; (2) the 20% differential in 
enrollment drawn from the Frederiksen and Schrader (5) study underesti-
mates the true difference in attainment; or (3) the use of years completed 
toward a diploma or degree as a measure of attainment results in signifi-
cant underestimation by excluding partial years of full time equivalency 
3The President's Commission on Veterans Pensions, Staff Reports I-
XII; U. S. Bureau of the Census, U. S. Census of Population for 1950; 
and various studies on the educational status of servicemen by the U.S. 
Army and the Veterans Administration at the end of WWII. For a detailed 
breakdown, see reference (14, pp. 27-28). 
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completed, and education completed by those veterans not studying toward 
a specific degree or diploma. Nam's conclusion regarding the impact of 
the GI Bill educational benefits is at variance with majority opinion, 
perhaps best typified by R. A. Walks (29, p. 2) contention that the GI 
Bill "paved the way for the most dramatic enrollment explosion in the 
history of higher education". 
· ~~i:irther''attempts to measure the significance of GI Bill educational. 
benefits did not occur until 1972 when Thrainn Eggertsson (4) completed 
a dissertation study of higher education taken under the WWII GI Bill 
of Rights. Based on data drawn from a national survey of veterans 
conclucted by the Census Bureau :in 196 7, Eggertsson estimated the overall 
magnitude of educational investment under the WWII1 GI Bill and computed 
a social rate of return on that investment of 9. 7% for a high school 
graduate who attended four years of college. Availability of GI Bill 
benefits for the same veteran was estimated to increase his private rate 
of return from 10 .9% to 14. 8% based on projected earnings functions 
(p. 133, 140). These findings are consistent with economic theory as a 
reduction in opportunity cost via the subsidy would be expected to 
increase the private rate of return. 
Eggertsson (4, p. 145) finds a difference in educational investment 
by wwn:. veterans attributable to the availability of GI· Bill benefits of 
$4.6 billion. His analysis, however, is (with the exception of the 
overall magnitude of investment) based upon an estimated 26% differential 
in investment resulting from the availability of benefits. 'lhis esti-
mated average (mean) differential is, in turn, based on Strom's survey 
of WWII college veterans. 
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Eggertsson (4) multiplied his estimate of the total post-service 
stock of education acquired by veterans (college years x $3,300) by the 
mean of 26% to arrive at the estimated differential of $4.6 billion. He 
readi.Jy admits that Strom's (20) results (and therefore his own) "must 
be treated with some caution because of the hypothetical nature of the 
questions posed to the veterans" (p. 55). Eggertsson' s estimate of the 
differential in post-service educational investment due to the GI Bill 
may be low because it does not allow for increases in education by those 
veterans who would have gone to school without the benefits, but attended 
longer because the benefits were available. In addition, the estimated 
percentage differential would only be representative for the 194 7 school 
year in which the Strom survey was conducted. 
One of the earliest efforts to empirically assess the impact of GI 
Hill educational benefits on various racial and socioeconomic subgroups 
of veterans was a study in 1971 by Griliches and Mason (7). Their 
investigation, based on a 1964 Current Population Survey by the Census 
Bureau, was intended to estimate the bias in the education coefficient 
produced by a regression of income on education, with out con trolling for 
differences in ability. A relatively strong correlation was observed 
between schooling completed before military service, and mental ability 
(measured by Armed Forces Qualification Test scores, AFQT) and personal 
background factors. A much lower correlation was found between schooling 
completed after entl'.' into the Armed Forces and the same variables. 4 
4A conceptual problem with this 
AFQT scores as a proxy for ability. 
as opposed to an IQ test; thus it is 
See reference (11). 
approach may lie in the use of 
The AFQT is an achievement test 
not merely a measure of ability. 
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Eggertsson (4, p. 86) found lower earnings for veterans who 
completed one or more years of college after discharge, relative to the 
earnings of veterans of the same age and educational attainment who 
completed their educations before separation. He cites the Griliches 
and Mason findings as support for his hypothesis that the earnings dif-
ferential may exist because the group containing those who attended 
college after military service included a greater proportion of individuals 
from socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds. It was Eggertsson 's 
con ten ti on that: 
the veterans who would not have come to college without 
the GI BiLl subsidy were more likely to have been relatively 
disadvantaged in terms of such things as social and economic . 
background and intelligence (p. 67). 
I 
The only test of this prop0sition is the observed difference 
between the earnings of "trainees" (those who acquired part of their 
education after discharge) and "nontrainees". Eggertsson fails to 
consider that part of the earnings differential may be due to less 
experience on the part of trainees at the same skill (education) level. 
While the differential in earnings may, in reality, largely be the result 
of disadvantaged backgrounds, he does not attempt to determine whether 
a systematic difference in backgrounds exists. 
Eggertsson's (4) calculations also indicate that the earnings 
differential between blacks and nonblacks was lower among veterans 
with college educations than among veterans having only a high school 
education. Annual earnings of blacks were 53% of average nonblack 
earnings among high school graduates, and 75% of nonblack earnings 
among college graduates (p. 101). He cautions that these results may be 
questionable because of the low number of black college graduates in the 
sample. 
13 
1~e most significant work toward evaluating the impact of the GI 
Bill educational benefits on blacks was recently completed by David 
O'Neill and Sue Goetz Ross (17) at the Center for Naval Analysis. Their 
study of Vietnam era veterans focuses on education and earnings data of 
those enrolled in vocational post-service education. They omit part 
time users of the GI Bill benefits from their examination, as well as 
former officers. 
O'Neill and Ross (17, p. 56) found that "black veterans participate 
more than nonblack veterans within every AFQT/prior education cell 
and utilize more entitlement per participant than similar nonblack 
veterans". Based on estimated earnings functions, they found that before 
training the earnings of blacks were 15% lower than those of nonblacks. 
I 
Earnings functions estimated after training revealed no significant 
black/nonblack earnings differential. This lead the authors to conclude 
that "a voucher-type system (such as the post-Korean GI Bill) can be 
relied on to help blacks participate in the labor market on an equal 
footing with other segments of society" (17, p. 39). 
The O'Neill and Ross (17) study found that black veterans were more 
apt to use GI Bill educational entitlements and to use them for longer 
periods than nonblack veterans having similar AFQT scores and prior 
education. Their study does not show that this larger propensity for 
post-service education by blacks results solely from GI Bill benefit 
availability. It is conceivable that black veterans obtained more post-
service education than similar nonblacks for reasons other than the 
availability of benefits. For example, the average black veteran may 
have been relatively unexposed to people, places, and ideas outside of 
a restricted environment prior to his service experience. The opportunity 
14 
to travel and be<.:ome familiar with the economic and other advantages of 
further education may have produced a relatively strong impact on the 
attitudes of heretofore underexposed veterans foward further attainment. 
Also, the relatively high unemployment rate among blacks meant that 
their implicit costs of education were lower than those of nonblacks. 
It has proven difficult to show what portion, if any, of the 
differential in post-service attainment is due to the availability of 
benefits. A useful step in this direction would be to show that the 
differential in post -service attainment is reduced when benefits are 
not available. 
Difficulty incurred in attempting to separate the effects of the 
GI subsidy from those of the service experience lTd Eggertsson to 
observe that: 
•.• although it is a fairly common belief that the Bill was 
responsible for a great deal (of schooling), nobody has esti-
mated statistically the extent of this influence, using some 
form of supply and demand analysis (4, p. 44). 
There is general support in the literature for the propositions that the 
GI Bill has had a significant impact on the total quantity of education 
obtained by veterans, and that the effect on attainment has been parti-
cularly strong for blacks. The testing of these hypotheses, however, 
has suffered from. a lack of data that would enable the user to separate 
the effects of the subsidy on post-service education from those of the. 
service experience. 
CHAPTER III 
HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY AND LITERATURE 
Much of the pioneering work in human capital theory is the product 
of Gary Becker (1) (2). The theory is designed to explain the way the 
labor market operates, and is based on the assumption that labor is 
treated by employers as an economic good. It is capable of explaining 
much of what has been observed empirically regarding relationships 
between earnings, experience, unemployment, educat;:ion and skill level. 
A crucial assumption in human capital theory is that individuals 
make investment decisions by comparing the present value of expected 
benefits and costs. The costs of human capital investment are classified 
as explicit expenditures such as tuition, books, and fees, and implicit 
costs, primarily foregone earnings. Benefits to the individual include 
higher earnings, and the monetary equivalent of psychic benefits. 
Benefits to society from these investments are defined in such terms as 
increased worker productivity, a better citizenry, a lower crime rate, 
and improved race relations. 
Human capital theory maintains that a significant contribution 
toward narruwing income differentials will result from efforts successful 
in increasing the educational attainment of individuals from lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds. The human capital approach to earnings 
determination is based on the premise that the principal characteristic 
differentiating members of the labor force from each other is th~ir skill 
15 
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level (13, p. 241). It emphasizes the pivotal role of formal education 
in raising the productivity of workers. Accordingly: 
.•. a natural consequence of the acceptance of human capital 
theory by many labor economists in the 1960's was to emphasize 
education as an important policy instrument for raising the 
productivity, and hence the earnings, of low income individuals 
(13, p. 243). 
l t also follows from neo-classieal economic theory that increasing the 
"value of marginal product" (\IMP) of a resource, such as labor through 
education, w:ill result in an increase in overall welfare, provided the 
increase in the VMPL exceeds the VMP foregone when resources are with-
drawn from alternative uses in order to provide that increment in educa-
tion. 
In terms of human capital theory, the availability of GI Bill 
I 
educational benefits will lower the private opportunity cost of further 
education for eligible veterans. 'lllis reduction in opportunity cost 
increases the private rate of return on additional investment, inducing 
more veterans to enroll in post-service programs than would otherwise 
be the case. Additionally, those veterans who would have attended 
schools without GI Bill benefits will be inclined to· attend longer as a 
result of the higher private rate of return on further investment. For 
example, Eggertsson found that availability of the GI Bill benefits 
raised the private rate of return on four years of college from 10.9% to 
14. 2% ( 4, p • 133, 140) • 
ln attempting to evaluate the social desirability of any government 
program such as the GI Bill educational benefits, the first step must be 
to compare the social rate of return on educational investment directly 
resulting from the availability of the benefits with the next best 
alternative. Studies by Becker (1, p. 78), Hansen (9, p. 149), and 
17 
Hnnoch (8, p. 71) have found pr.lvate ratt!S of rettrrn on investment in a 
J'our year college oducnt:Lon to he in th(! range of 11% to 14%, with 
social rates of return on the same investment yielding at least 10%. The 
social rate of return on alternative investments by government is 
generally regarded to be 10% at most. In his study of WWII veterarts who 
acquire coliege training after separation from the Armed Forces, 
Eggertsson found social rates of return comparable to Becker's once 
1 
allowances were made for differences in background. It is generally 
agreed among the authors that there is no evidence of serious under-
investment in higher education when the average social rate of return 
on investment in college is compared with the social alternative rate. 
of return. 
I 
While there does not appear to be a severe educational underinvest-
ment problem in the aggregate, a problem does exist for those potential 
students whose social rates of return justify investment in higher 
education, but are unable to make that investment because they come from 
disadvantaged backgrounds. Recent studies have shown that among the 
most able high school graduates, 95% of those from high socioeconomic 
groups attended college, while only 50% of those most able originating 
from low socioeconomic groups attended (1, p. 134). These findings, 
when coupled with the demonstrated correlation between low earnings and 
low educational attainment, suggest that some programs to assist poor 
students in financing their education may be warranted in order to 
1Becker. (1, p·. 20) estimated a social rate of return froni investment 
in 4+ years of college to be 10% to 13% depending on the student's ability 
and social background, with the rate to the typical high school student 
on a college degree being 10%. Eggertsson (4·, p.·142)"estimated the 
social rate of return on 4 yeal:s of college to veterans who were high 
school graduates to be 9.7%. 
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(1) break the cl rcle of poverty and reduce income differentials, and 
(2) increase the efficiency of educational investment and thereby raise 
net tlational product. 
Hanoch (8, p. 63) .and others have assumed that, on average, a 
college student earns enough working part time to cover the direct 
private costs of college. Therefore, the GI benefits may be viewed as 
serving to increase the private rate of return on educational investment 
by partially offsetting the opportunity cost to veterans of attending 
college. Gary Becker (1, p. 77) first noted "the dominance of foregone 
earnings and the relative unimportance of tuition," in determining educa-
tional investment. Becker concludes that eliminating tuition only 
increases the private rate of r~tum'for a college education from 
approximately 14.5% to 15.5% for white males. Thus: 
. • . good economic reasons may prevent poor high school 
graduates from attending even tuition free colleges. 
Elimination of foregone earnings should have a much 
greater effect on their incentive to go to college (1, p. 77). 
By Becker's reasoning, voucher programs such as those used in the Korean 
and Vietnam Era GI Bills should have a significant impact on educational 
investment by disadvantaged veterans through reduction of their 
opportunity costs. 
The reader will recall that Eggertsson (4, p. 67) reached a similar 
conclusion in attempting to explain the earnings differential he 
observed between veterans who obtained all of their education before 
separation from the service, and those veterans with the same educational 
attainment who acquired part of their education after separation. He 
proposed that this earnings differential results at least in part from 
the higher proportion of individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds in 
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the post-service group. Those veterans who would not have gone to school 
without the subsidy were more likely to come from relatively disadvan-
taged backgrounds. 
If Eggertsson is correct, it is likely that the post-service group 
in his study contains a relatively large proportion of individuals from 
racial/ethnic minorities. Assuming this to be the case, they would be 
expected to receive lower earnings as a result of current and past 
discrimination. 
This explanation is in line with what would be expected on the 
basis of the Becker analysis. There are, however, factors which must be 
controlled in order to evaluate the proposition that earnings among 
veterans having equal educational attainment differ because of systematic 
differences in their socioeconomic backgrounds. .To lend support to 
Eggertsson 's explan'ation of earnings differentials, it must first be 
established that the socioeconomic backgrounds of trainees and non--trainees 
differ systematically. As previously noted, Eggertsson does not attempt 
to evaluate this hypothesis, beyond observing that it would be consistent 
with his findings on earnings differentials. 
Potential students from disadvantaged backgrounds will, on average, 
have lower foregone earnings. The GI Bill subsidy will reduce the fore-
gone earnings of attending school by an equal amotmt for each user. For 
disadvantaged students who have relatively low foregone earnings, the 
percentage reduction in costs will be greater. It is also probable that 
veterans from disadvantaged backgrounds will receive a larger increase 
in their expected private rates of return on educational investment as a 
2 
result of the subsidy. 
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Thus it might be expected that a higher pro-
portion of veterans from socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds 
will participate in these educational programs. 
The second, and most important, factor tending to increase the 
relative participation of socioeconomically disadvantaged veterans in 
GI Bill subsidized educational programs results from the impact of such 
programs on financing costs. According to Becker (1, p. 107), the most 
important cause of differences in opportunities is differences in the 
availability of funds. Socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals will, 
on ayer age, have to borrow more funds in order to finance a given amO'lmt 
of education (beyond some minimal amount) than their counterparts from 
higher socioeconomic backgrounds. According to theory, an individual 
will want to undertake further investment in education if his expected 
rate of return on said investment exceeds that available from his next 
best alternative. For the .!l2!!.,-borrowing student, the correct alternative 
rate (marginal cost of funds for financing) is that which could be earned 
by him as a result of investing funds in a project of similar risk and 
duration. For the student who must borrow funds in order to finance 
2rt is possible that the opposite is true in certain cases, e.g., 
if the increment in earnings is very small. One can make simplifying 
assumptions to insure that this does not occur. For example, if it is 
assumed that the increase in earnings from the increment in education is 
twice as high for nonblacks, but that nonblacks also have opportunity 
costs that are twice as high, then, nonblacks and. blacks have equal rates 
of return on investment. If opportunity costs are then reduced by equal 
absolute amoi.mts, the rate of return for blacks will increase more ·than 
the rate of return for nonblacks. 
In order to empirically investigate the impact of· the subsidy on 
rates of return, one can apply the $39·60 basic subsidy entitlement under 
the Korean GI Bill as a reduction to 1959 opportunity costs for whites 
and nonwhites (a black/nonblack breakdown is not given in the Censua data). 
In this case, the increase in the rate of return is higher for nonwhites 
than whites. It appears likely that this result is typical. 
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education, the applicable opportunity cost is the interest rate he must 
pay on borrowed funds. 
As a result of a lack of homogeneity in the capital market and 
variations in risk, the alternative rate for borrowing students exceeds 
that of non-borrowing students. Differences in the interest rates for 
internal and external funds will cause "the wealthier person to purchase 
more human capital than the poorer person, despite the fact they are of 
equal ability," according to Marshall, Cart ter, and King ( 13, p. 252) • 
Becker (1) and Perlman (18) also theorize that the borrowing student 
faces a higher alternative rate than the self-financing student; there-
fore, the "economic motivation for investmant in education is weaker for 
the poorer student who must borrow to pay for his1 schooling" (18, p. 57). 
It is the social rate of return for the marginal students attracted 
by the subsidy that must be compared with the social alternative rate of 
return in attempting to evaluate the social desirability of the GI Bill 
programs. Perlman and Eggertsson both note that the marginal students 
attracted by a subsidy will have lower rates of return (private and 
social) than the average student (18, p. 108). Additional educational 
investment via a subsidy cannot be justified on rate of return criteria 
unless the rate of return on investment for marginal students attracted 
by the subsidy exceeds the alternative social rate of return. However, 
this type of analysis assumes equality of opportunity for all potential 
students. If some students experience the effects of discrimination on 
potential earnings, their private and social rates of return will be 
biased downward. 
A second shortcoming of rate of return analysis when applied to 
educational investment is that many of the benefits derived from increased 
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education are non-quantifiable, e.g. , consumption benefits. Perlman and 
others refer to the need to deal with more than just the increased 
financial earnings resulting from education in any attempt to evaluate 
social and private returns to investment in education. 
If public policy is directed to the ma:K::Lmum welfare of the 
population in the broadest sense of the term • • • then 
consumption benefits derived from education should be 
considered as an addition to financial returns in evaluating 
social returns to educational investment • • • [Also~ a 
broader concept of returns would include] other social 
goals such as improved race relations and poverty reduction 
through schooling (18, p. 43). 
ffiAPTER IV 
A THEORETICAL MODEL 
Gary Becker was the first to view human capital educational invest-
ment decisions in terms of supply and demand analysis. It is this 
framework that is perhaps best suited for viewing the effects of' the GI 
subsidy on different socioeconomic groups. It has been contended thus 
far that the GI bill will serve to increase the private rate of return 
on educational investment for all veterans through a reduction in oppor-
tunity costs, and will have a particularly strong influence on investment 
decisions by those veterans from disadvantaged backgrounds through a 
reduction in the amounts they must borr<JW. Becker's (2, pp. 9-10) 
approach to human capital investment involves a more detailed breakdown 
of financing sources than is employed here. Rather, the present develop-
ment begins with a more generalized approach to supply and demand for 
educational investment, similar to that used by Reynolds (19, pp. 299-
304). 
In Figure 1, human capital investment in terms of cost is measured 
along the horizontal axis for an individual. Anticipated monetary 
benefits from educational investment plus the monetary equivalent of 
psychic benefits determine an individual's demand for education. The 
approach developed here emphasizes the direct monetary returns from 
education. Thus, the demand function in Figure 1 shows how much each 
increment in educational investment.will yield in the form of increased 
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Figure 1. Supply and Demand for Human Capital Investment 
24 
25 
earnings, measured in dollars along the vertical axis. The total increase 
1 in earnings from a given level of educational investment is indicated· 
by the area under the demand curve up to that level of investment. 
The demand curve for human capital investment is downward sloping, 
indicating that as the amowt invested increases, the anticipated incre-
m~nt in earnings from additional investment declines. This results pri-
2 
marily from diminishing returns to fixed human capacities. Also, the 
reduction in time remaining for benefits to accrue as more years are 
spent in capital formation contributes to a negatively sloped demand 
curve. 
The supply curve in Figure 1 shows the private marginal cost of 
producing an additional unit of. human capital, irtcluding tuition, fees, 
financing costs, and foregone earnings. The private marginal cost of 
producing each increment in human capital investment is measured along 
the vertical axis in dollars. The supply curve is upward sloping 
throughout, showing that each increment in investment is more costly 
in terms of earnings foregone and financing. The individual is assumed 
to initially employ the cheapest source of financing funds, moving to 
increasingly expensive sources as it becomes necessary to do so. As 
the investor moves to external sources of financing, he finds he must 
pay increasingly higher interest rates on each additional dollar borrowed 
in order to compensate for the increasing risk to his lenders. This means 
1 Represents increase in earnings over and above an earnings base, 
the base representing what could be earned by a completely uneducated and 
untrained individual. Thus the area under the demand curve shows the 
increase in earnings attributable to human capital investment. 
2 If diminishing returns set in at an increasing rate, the demand 
function will be concave when viewed from the origin. The assumption of 
a concave demand curve is not essential for the analysis that follows, 
though it is consistent with the Reynolds presentation. 
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that the marginal coHI: for f1m<ls, and thus the mnrginnl cost (private) 
of producing additional units of human capital, rises increasingly as 
the investor turns to outside sources. '!bus the slope of the SUJ?ply 
function for human capital investment reflects both increasing foregone 
earnings and increasing financing costs as investment is increased. 
The total private production costs for any given level of human 
capital investment is given by the area under the supply curve up to that 
level of investment (summation of the marginal costs of production). The 
optimal amount of investment occurs at the level where the supply and 
demand functions intersect, Point A in Figure 1. The amount of investment 
is labeled OH. At this level the marginal benefits in terms of increased 
earnings from the last unit of investment is equaited with marginal costs 
of producing that unit. This insures maximization of the difference 
between benefits derived from human capital investment and private 
production costs. 
Marshall, Cartter, and King (13, pp. 250-251) have proposed that if 
one follows Becker's definition of ability in terms of an individual's 
capacity to profit from human capital investment, the demand schedule of 
a more able person for human capital investment will lie to the right and 
above the demand curve of a less able person. In terms of the present 
graphic analysis, higher demand curves show that the same amount of 
investment yields larger increments to earnings. In a study of rates of 
return to investment in higher education, Greer (6, p. 64) found that 
private rates of return for whites on "investment in college in both 1960 
and 1970 were much greater than nonwhite returns, using both common white 
3 
and nonwhite opportunity cos ts and opportunity cos ts for nonwhites." 
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Greer states that the differences in the internal rates of return may be 
attributed to the effects of past discrimination. Perlman (18, p. 64) 
also concludes that there are lower returns from college for nonwhites, 
which outweigh their lower direct and indirect costs. 
Based upon these findings and an implicit assumption that blacks 
are more likely to suffer the effects of discrimination than nonblacks, 
separate demand functions are located to indicate increases in earnings 
for blacks and nonblacks (see Figure 2). The demand function for 
nonblacks lies to the right and above that for blacks, indicating that 
nonblacks receive higher increases in earnings from any given increment 
in human capital investment. An examination of Census data for 1960 and 
1970 reveals that there is consistently an absolute differential in 
incremental earnings between blacks and nonblacks resulting from each 
increment in educational attainment. 4 Th.ere is, therefore, empirical 
justification, for locating the demand functions to reflect greater 
increases in earnings from human capital investment for nonblacks. 
Within his egalitarian approach to human capital investment, 
Becker (2, p. 13) has theorized that individual investments in human 
capital will vary because of differences in such factors as family wealth 
3 ' Greer also found that the disparity in W:lite and nonwhite rates of 
return to investment in college education diminished from 1960 to 1970. 
4 Incremental changes in annual income for various educational 
attainments were computed from data contained in reference (23, pp. 2-3). 
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and subsidies which give some individuals greater opportunities to 
invest than others. 5 Elimination of these environmental differences 
would tend to equate opportunities for investment among individuals, 
thereby eliminating major differences in investment and earnings. In 
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his more generalized approach to human capital investment, Reynolds (19, 
p. 300) also depicts variations in investment attributable to differences 
in access to financing, though establishment of equal access to funds 
would not bring about equality of investments and incomes due to vari-
ations in individual demand functions. However. the degree of inequality 
would be less than if differences in financing opportunities were also 
present (19, p. 301). 
These environmental differences can be shown graphically by 
depicting separate supply (private marginal cost of production) schedules 
for individuals from socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds, and 
individuals who do not come from socioeconomically disadvantaged back-
grounds. If it is assumed that blacks are more likely to come from 
disadvantaged backgrounds than nonblacks, the supply function for 
nonblacks will lie to the right of and below the supply function for 
blacks (see Figure 2). The graphic presentation assumes that the 
foregone earnings costs of additional human capital investment are the 
same for blacks and nonblacks. Although it is recognized that, on 
average, blacks will have lower foregone earnings, the assumption of 
equal foregone earnings makes it possible to isolate the effects, of 
differences in financing opportunities between blacks and nonblacks. 
5 
. 'll1e egalitarian approach assumes that demand conditions are the 
same for .everyone, and that the only reason for variations in human 
capital investments and earnings is differences in the supply side. 
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'lhls as1:rnmpt1on i1:1 cons1.atent wJth Reynolds' analysis of supply and 
demand for human capital inves tmerit , wherein he states that the most 
plausible explanation for differences in supply curves is differences 
in access to financing (19, p. 300). 6 
The vertical distance between the supply curves measures the dif-
ferences in financing costs of producing each increment in investment. 
The optimal amount of investment for blacks is labeled OB in Figure 2, 
while that of nonblacks is labeled ON. The model implies that nonblacks 
will, on average, make larger investments in human capital than blacks 
due to differences in both supply and demand. Differences in investment 
due· to differences in demand may be related to past discrimination, 
particularly in the quality of schooling. Diffetences in investment 
resulting from differences in supply are attributable to financing 
opportunities. Earnings differentials between blacks and nonblacks 
result from differences in the amount of human capital investment 
(personal optimum), and discrimination (differences in demand). This 
tends to extend the black/nonblack differentials into the future •. 
The model is now assumed to relate specifically to black and non-
black veterans, and indicates their respective supply and demand for 
human capital investment. There is empirical evidence indicating that 
among veterans the differential in earnings between blacks and nonblacks 
declines as the level of educational investment increases. In his study 
of WWII veterans, Eggertsson (4, p. 101) fo\llld that annual earnings of 
blacks are 53% of those of nonblacks among high school graduates, and 
6 Cllanging the relative positions of the supply curves to reflect 
differences in opportunity costs does not appreciably effect the analysis 
that follows. Allowing for differences in foregone earnings merely 
complicates the graphic presentation. 
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75% of those of nonblacks among college graduates. This led Eggertsson 
to contend that there may be less discrimination, in relative terms, in 
occupations requiring college education. The O'Neill and Ross (17, p. 39) 
study of Vietnam era vocational trainees revealed that prior to training, 
earnings of blacks were approximately 15% lower than earnings of .similar · 
nonblacks. After training, there was no significant racial earnings 
differential. The results of both studies must be treated and applied 
with caution, especially the latter as it relates specifically ~o voca-
tional training. Nonetheless, the empirical e-vidence on veterans' 
. earnings which is available suggests that the variation between blacks 
and nonblacks in marginal returns on further investment declines as the 
amount of investment increases. Therefore, the demand functions 
indicating incremental earnings for human capital investment by black 
and nonblack veterans are shown as converging with additional investment 
(see Figure 3) • 7 
. The effect of the GI Bill educational subsidy will be to reduce the 
foregone earnings cost and the financing cost of each increment in 
investment. This may be shown graphically by a shift of the supply 
function (marginal cost of production) for each veteran to the right. 
The reduction in foregone earnings will be the same dollar amount for 
each veteran. However, the reduction in financing costs will be greater 
for those veterans who prior to the subsidy had to borrow more funds 
to finance a given increment in investment. Based on the assumption 
7 The analysis and conclusions which follow are not dependent upon 
the demand functions converging with additional investment. '!he demand 
function for nonblacks is given a steeper slope because the empirical 
evidence on veterans' earnings at various levels of attainment suggests 
that this is the case. 
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Figure 3. Supply and Demand for Human Capital Investment by Black 
and Nonblack Veterans 
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that black veterans will, on average, come from lower socioeconomic back-
grounds than nonblack veterans, the subsidy produces a larger relative 
shift in the black veterans supply function (see Figure 4). The larger 
shift is due to the relatively large reduction in the black veterans 
financing cost. Because the supply functions of black and nonblack 
veterans inclusive of the subsidy are closer together, a narrowing of 
the financing costs between the two groups results. 
'l'he new equilibriums indicate an increase in educational investment 
·by all veterans, with a larger absolute increase ani>ng blacks. The 
subsidy increases the educational investment of the average black veteran 
from OB1 to OB2 in Figure 4. The increase in investment for a nonblack 
veterans is from ON1 to ON2 • The increased investment in both c;:ises 
results from reductions in foregone earnings and financing costs. The 
comparatively large increase by blacks is due to the relatively strong 
impact of the subsidy in reducing their financing costs. 
The increase in earnings for black and nonblack veterans resulting 
from the subsidy are indicated by the shaded areas. While it appears 
from the graph that the increment in earnings will be greater for blacks, 
this is noJ: necessarily the case. Assuming comparable foregone earnings 
for both g-.:-oups, comparative increases in earnings depend on the posi-
tion and slope of the respective demand curves, and the difference in 
supply curve shifts resulting from the subsidy. However, the increase 
in educational investment resulting from the subsidy will always be 
greater for blacks unless the demand functions diverge with increasing 
8 investment, which one would not expect. Since the supply effects are 
8 . . 
If the demand functions did diverge, the relative increments in 
investment would also depend on the position and slope of the respective 
demand curves, and the difference in supply curve shifts. 
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Figure 4. Increases in Investment and Earnings Due to :Benefit 
Availability 
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greater for blacks, so too w:Lll he the increment in their investment. 
The relative increase in earnings for each· group is not predictable from 
the model. 
In terms of theory and the model presented here, it can be concluded 
that the availability of GI Bill educational benefits increases educa-. 
tional investment by all veterans, and has a particularly strong impact 
on investment decisions by socioeconomically disadvantaged veterans, 
primarily blacks. 
Perlman (18, p. 93) says that if there is inequality of opportunity, 
then on efficiency and equity grounds government should pursue a selective 
policy to provide education for those "who would profit from schooling . 
and who currently curtail their education because of lack of opportunity 
or_ resources." A general voucher program such as. the GI Bill will, ·in 
part, subsidize educational investment that would have occurred anyway. 
The impact, however, will be on the marginal student attracted as a 
result of the subsidy, and the additional attainment per student resulting 
from the expenditures. 
Thus while a selective policy to assist potential students from 
disadvantaged backgrounds might be preferable, it may well be that the 
GI Bill has been effective in providing educational opportunities for 
many socioeconomically disadvantaged American veterans. If this is in 
fact the case, arbitrary elimination of the benefits, without some new 
program(s) designed to increase educational .opportunities for those 
individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds, will create particular 
difficulties for minority groups as they strive to increase their 
educational attainment and thereby narrow existing income differentials. 
The poor are discriminated against, not by the wealthy, but by 
their poverty and their consequent inability to purchase good 
schooling with borrowed f\llldS ••• they are condemned for 
life to second-rate jobs and second-class citizenship by their 
inability to finance a better education (18, p. 119). 
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CHAPTER V 
DATA AND METHOOOLOGY 
·,. 
The purpose of this chapter is to test empirically some of the· 
tenets of human capital theory developed in the preceding chapter. 
Initially, data on post-service educational attainment by Korean· and 
peacetime post-Korean veterans will be utilized to evaluate the following 
hypothesis: 
Availability of the GI Bill edu~ational ben~fits has 
increased the post-service college educational attain-
ment of veterans. 
'lhe peacetime post-Korean veterans with no active service prior to 
February 1, 1955, are unique in that they were not eligible for GI Bill 
educational benefits during the immediate years following separation 
from the Armed Forces. Nor was there any way for them to foresee that 
they would eventually become eligible for such a subsidy under the 
Vietnam Era GI Bill (effective June 1, 1966). O'Neill' and Ross (17, 
p. 43) state that a comparison of total education and training acquired 
by peacetime post-Korean veterans with that acquired by yeteranS having 
benefits would "shed some light on the broad question of whether the GI 
Bill subsidy increases investment in education and training or replaces 
investment that would have taken place anyway." By comparing college 
level educational attainment of post-Korean veterans during the period 
they were ineligible for benefits with post-service attainment by 
veterans who enjoyed benefit eligibility during that same approximate 
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period (Korean veterans), the initial hypothesis can be tested and any 
differential in investment estimated. 
1be second hypothesis to be evaluated is: 
The GI Bill educational benefits have caused a greater 
increase in post-service college educational attainment 
for black veterans than for nonblack veterans. 
By comparing the post-service college educational attainment of 
black veterans of the Korean Conflict who were eligible for benefits 
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to that of black post-Korean veterans who were not eligible for benefits, 
it is possible to determine whether benefit availability was a signifi-
cant determinant of investment, and measure the extent of any differential 
in investment. A parallel comparison of post-service attainment by 
nonblacks with benefits and nonblacks without benefits will yield 
similar information regarding the influence of benefit availability on 
educational investment by nonblack veterans. After developing this 
information for both black and nonblack veterans, the relative influence 
of benefit availability on post-service investment by each group can be 
determined. 
The Data 
Data generated from a random survey of veterans conducted in 1967 
by the Bureau of the Census on behalf of the Veterans Administration are 
employed to evaluate the hypotheses. A total of 11,839 veterans were 
surveyed, with detailed information obtained concerning education, 
1 income, and other personal characteris ti.cs. Speci fie information is 
provided regarding the amount of education attained between separation 
1 A copy of the survey questionnaire is included in Appendix B. 
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and the date of the survey (March 15, 1967), as well as a breakdown of 
post service attainment by number of months acquired with and without 
GI Bill assi.stance. 
'lhe present analysis is restricted to the survey data relating to 
Korean and post-Korean veterans only, who had at least a high school 
2 
education at the time of their separation (a total of 2,316 veterans). 
lhe restriction limiting the analysis to Korean and post-Korean veterans 
is made so that the post-service time frame under investigation and other . 
factors aside from the availability of GI Bill benefits will be as similar 
as possible for all veterans included in the study. The minimum prior 
education constraint is included in order to better define the relevant 
population base; i.e., those ve.terans who would consider an investment 
. 3 
in post-service college educatjon. 
While the data do not permit a view of the total (life-time) post-
service attainment by two groups differing only with regard to benefit 
availability, the data do enable a determination and comparison of 
educational investment by veterans over a period of years during which 
.one group had benefits and one did not. 
Methodology 
l.n order to evaluate the first hypothesis, a stepwise multiple 
regresslon technique employing both continuous and dummy independent 
2 All veterans with any service prior to the Korean War are elimi-
nated from the sample group. 
3 Although veterans who acquire a high school diploma after separa-
tion then go on to college are eliminated from further consideration, 
the number of such cases is relatively small. In any event, their 
omission will not effect the analysis as long as their incidence (and 
amount of investment) is distr:lbuted in approximately the same manner 
among those veterans with benefits, and those without benefits. 
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variables is used t:o cstlmate an equation of the general form: 
(5.1) 
where Y is equal to the number of months of post-service college educa-
tional attainment, and x1 through Xn represent the variables which are 
statistically significant in explaining the observed variation in Y 
among the veterans in the sample group. The Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression technique is used to estimate the individual beta values 
which denote the relationship between the dependent variable (Y) and each 
of the explanatory variables entered. The error term (E) connotes 
variation in the dependent variable not attributable to variation in 
the explanatory variables. '!his unexplained random variation is due to 
the influence of unknown factors on the dependent variable. 
Pararooters est:lmated by the OLS regression method have the properties 
of Best Linear Unbiased Estimators. The least squares estimators are 
"best" in the sense that their variance is a minimum, and unbiased since 
4 the expected value of the estimated parameter is equal to the true value. 
The use of dummy variables allows the researcher to measure the 
impact of qualitative variables (such as marital status) on the dependent 
variable. : 'Ihe technique consists of assigning the value "one" to indi-
cate the presence of a particular attribute believed by the researcher 
to have an impact on the dependent variable. The absence of the attri-
bute ls reflected by a "zero" in each case. When using a zero/one dummy 
variable technique and an intercept term, it is essential that "the 
number of dummy variables be one less than the number of different ways 
4 Fnr a full discussion of OLS estimators, see reference (3, pp. 49-
64). 
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the attribute under consideration is expected to affect the dependent 
variable" (3, p. 162). Otherwise the observation matrix will have 
linearly dependent columns (will be singular), and the matrix cannot be 
inverted. The usual procedure to avoid this "dummy variable trap" is 
to drop a dummy term for each attribute when performing OLS estimation. 5 
When interpreting the estimated function, the influence of the dummy 
variable omitted for each attribute is contained within the intercept 
term (B ). 
0 
The stepwise regression method recursively constructs a prediction 
equation one independent variable at a time. '!he first step involves 
choosing the si.ngle variable which is the best predictor of the dependent 
variable. The second independent variable to be 1added to the equation 
i8 that which best increases the predictive power in conjunction with 
the fl rs t. Further variables are added as long as their inclusion makes 
a significant contrlbution to the explanatory power of the equation 
(16, p. 180). 
The selection process for inclusion of variables utilizes two pieces 
of information. 'Th.e first is the normalized beta coefficient that the 
variable would have if included in the equation. The significance of 
beta is defermined by the F statistic. A variable is not included unless 
the computed F exceeds a predetermined critical value. 
The second criterion employed is the tolerance, the value of which 
may fall anywhere from zero through one. If the tolerance is small, then 
5For example if one sought to include as a determinant of the 
dependent variable the attribute "race" for which there were two possible 
categories (black and nonblack), only a single dummy variable would be 
included as opposed to including one dummy variable for each of the two 
groups. 
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the variable in question is nearly a linear combination of those variables 
already in the equatio11. Higher tolerance values suggest the variable 
adds a new dimension to the equation (16, p. 180). Prospective yariables 
are not included if the computed tolerance falls below the critical value 
specified in the program. The amount of additional variance explained 
by adding a variable to the equation is the product of the regression 
coefficient (beta) squared and the tolerance. Thus, variables are -
eliminated "whenever their addition would produce little increase in the 
. . . 211 ( ) 
coefficient of multiple determination, R 12, p. 335 • 
The nature of the relationship between the dependent variable and 
each explanatory variable retained is specified by the correspondin~ 
beta coefficient. For those explanatory variables rejected as not 
proving significant at the 95% confidence level, the direction of 
variation with the dependent variable is determined from the matrix of 
correlation coefficients. The explanatory variables initially entered 
into the program and the expected signs are as follows: 
x1 = number of months out of service at the time of the survey. 
s1 is expected to be positive (+) in sign. The longer the individual 
has been 01llt of service, the more time he has had to acquire post-service 
education. Cetcris paribus, one would expect the veteran who has been 
out of service four years to have acquired more post•service education 
than the veteran who has been separated for only six months. 
x2 . = ~ge of the veteran (in months) at the time of separation. 
The opportunity cost of further education increases with age, and the 
benefits to be derived from such investment decrease due to a shorter 
time span over which benefits (in the form of additional earnings} can 
accrue. Both factors cause the private rate of return to be expected 
from post-service education to decline as the age of. the veteran 
increases. The sign of the B2 coefficient is expected to be negative 
(-),reflecting an inverse relationship between age at separation and 
months of post-service attainment. 
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x3 = highest year of schooling the veteran had completed at the 
time of his separation. Empirical studies by Becker (1), Perlman (18), 
Hanoch (8), and Hansen (9) have shown a declining rate of return on 
further educational investment as the level of education increases, due 
to rising opportunity~costs. Becker (1) states that: 
since nobody can use his time at any activity without taking 
with him all of his human capital, the latter enters as an 
input along with his time in the production of additional 
capital ••• ·as he continues to invest ••• the· capital 
accumulated becomes increasingly valuable, and so too does 
his time (p. 7). 
However, Becker also finds that the expected rate of return from 
completing the last two years of college is much higher than that to be 
expected as a result of merely completing the first two years. In point 
of fact, O'Neill and Ross (17, p. 63) found in their study of Vietnam 
Era veterans and their usage of GI Bill benefits that "veterans with 
relatively low prior educational attainment do not use their entitlements 
at as high arate as those with higher attainments." Since the present 
investigation is restricted to college level investment by veterans with 
a min.imum high school prior attainment, one would expect the "diploma 
effect" to produce a positive association between the amount of post-
service investment and the level of attainment at separation. B3 is 
expected to be positive in sign. 
x4 = gap (in months) between the end of pre-service schooling and 
entry into the Armed Forces. A negative correlation between the 
dependent variable and the schooling/entry gap is expected. This pre-
diction is based on the assumption that the longer the individual has 
been out of school prior to entry into the service, the less likely he 
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is to return to school following separation, other factors held constant. 
1be veteran with the longer schooling/entry gap is likely to have more 
work experience. Therefore, his opportunity costs associated with 
additional investment are apt to be higher. 
x5 = dununy variable indicating whether or not the veteran was 
eligible tb receive GI Bill educational benefits. The x5 variable takes 
a value of one if benefits were available, zero otherwise. 'lhe value of 
the coefficient is expected to be positive. Human capital theory suggests 
that this will be the case since the availability of benefits increases 
the expected private rate of return on post-service educational investment. 
In terms of the model developed in the preceding chapter, the availability 
of benefits shifts the supply curve (marginal cost of production) of the 
individual veteran to the right, thereby increasing his optimum amount of 
investment. The shift occurs because the availability of benefits reduces 
the cost of foregone earnings and reduces financing costs associated with 
investment,in human capital. 
x6 = ~ununy variable reflecting the region where the veteran resides. 
Specifically, the x6 variable takes a value of one if the veteran lives 
in the northeast or north central region of the country, zero otherwise. 
States vary widely with respect to the private direct costs of obtaining 
higher education in a public ins ti tu ti on. Since a 1*ajori ty of those 
veterans attending college do so at public institutions, variation in 
their tuition levels have recently led to charges that the voucher system 
of equal payments discriminates against veterans from areas where public 
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Huli:;ltll:t.ation 1H low and tuition payments are correspondingly high. 
Specifically, it has been alleged that the present GI Bill discriminates 
agairtst Vietnam Era veterans in Northeastern and Midwestern states, and 
favors those who live in the South and West. In 1973, the Educational 
Testing Service found that "analysis of participation rates indicate a 
high correlation between participation and the availability of low-cost 
easily accessible institutions of higher learning" (26, p. 11). A 
breakdown of participation rates by state for fiscal year 1976 is illu"'.'" 
s tratcd by Figure 5. 
In a separate analysis prepared for the National League of Cities 
and the United States Conference of Mayors in 1976, it was concluded 
that the use of the CI Bill is highest in the states of the West and 
Southwest where tuitions are lowest. The report finds that between 1968 
and 1976: 
Sunbelt states with almost the same number of veterans used 
45.6% or $3.6 billion more in federally financed GI Bill 
scholarships that did Eastern and Midwestern states. What 
apparently makes the GI Bill more attractive in some states 
than in others is that when tuition is low it means that 
there will be more money left to apply toward living 
expenses (21, p. 23) .6 
It appears that differences in interregional direct private costs 
have contr~buted to interregional variation in participation rates under 
the present GI Blll. One would expect to find the same approximate 
variation with respect to tuition charges between regions during the 
period under consideration in the present study. Therefore, veterans in 
6 The report cites the example of a veteran attending San Francisco 
State University who would have 85.9% of the GI Bill allotment remaining 
after paying educational costs, while a Philadelphia veteran attending 
Temple University would be left with only 43% of the grant after paying 
college expenses. See reference (21, p. 23). 
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Lhe Nortlie;wt and North CentraJ sections of the cotmtry will likely 
obtain less post-service education than their counterparts residing in 
the South and West, ceteris paribus. B6 is expected to be a negative 
value. 
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x7 = dummy variable indicating whether or not the veteran is 
disabled. The x7 variable takes a value of one if the veteran has a 
service connected disability, zero otherwise. A positive correlation 
between disability and post-service education taken is expected because 
of lower opportunity costs due to lower foregone earnings for diabled 
veterans vis-a-vis those veterans who are not disabled. As a result of 
his impediment, the disabled veteran may also desire more education 
than his non"".'disabled counterpart in order to qualify for an employment 
position where his disability will not severely affect his performance. 
In addition, the disabled veteran ordinarily will be eligible for other 
government programs that serve as further incentives to increase his 
education. For these reasons, the sign of the B7 coefficient is expected 
to be positive. 
x8 = dummy variable taking a value of one if the veteran was married 
at the time of the survey, zero otherwise. The relationship is expected 
to be negative, based on the premise that marriage increases the need for 
the veteran to obtain and maintain employment in order to support his 
household. The increa.<ied financial responsibility associated with 
marriage thus acts as a det1:~rrent to the attainment of further education. 
Recall that this was cited as a rationale for adoption of the Korean GI 
Bill (see page 1), Therefore B8 is predicted to be negative in value. 
x9 = dummy variable reflecting whether or not the veteran is black. 
The variable takes a value of one if the veteran is black, zero otherwise. 
Blacks will have lower private rates of return on educational investment 
due to the effects of discrimination. Perlman (18), Becker (1), and 
Hano ch ( 8) have all found that the lower opportunity cos ts for blacks 
are outweighed by lower earnings resulting from discrimination, producing 
lower rates of return on educational investment. Furthermore, blacks 
are more likely to come from socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds, 
and are therefore more likely to require borrowed funds in order to 
finance further education. Since they must, on average, borrow more, 
they face greater costs in financing any given amount of further educa-
tion than nonblack veterans. 
Tn terms of the theoretical model of the preceding chapter, the 
supply function for black veterans lies further ~o the left (a lower 
supply) than that of nonblacks due to differences in financing costs, 
while the demand function for black veterans lies to the left and below 
that of nonblacks as a result of the effects of discrimination. Both 
supply and demand differences contribute to a lower "optimum" investment 
for black vis-a-vis nonblack veterans. 
However, many of the veterans in the sample had GI Bill educational 
benefits available to them, and one would predict that the availability 
of benefits will have a larger impact on blacks than nonblacks with 
respect to post-service investment. It is expected that any differential 
in the propensity of blacks and nonblacks to acquire post-service educa-
tion wlll narrow as a result of the availability of benefits to some 
veterans. One would not predict that the impact of benefit availability 
to the Korean veterans is large enough to offset an otherwise expected 
negative correlation between black veterans and post-service attainment. 
Therefore, the expectation is that B9 will be negative in sign. 
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The omitted reference category for the dummy variables contain all 
the dunnny terms which were dropped (one for each qualitative attribute) 
so that the determinant of the observation matrix will be nonsingular. 
Given the preceding suggested explanatory variables, the omitted 
reference category consists of a veteran who: (1) is not eligible for 
benefits; (2) resides in the south or west; (3) is not disabled; (4) is 
not married at the time of the survey; and (5) is nonblack. The influ-
ence of these omitted variables is contained within the intercept term 
(B0 ). Examination of the coefficient for the benefit variable (entered 
as x5 ) provides the basis for accepting (or rejecting) the first 
hypothesis. 
In order to evaluate the second. hypothesis, 1the veterans are first 
divided into two groups, blacks and nonblacks. A stepwise multiple 
regression of the type employed to test the first hypothesis is then 
run on each of the two groups. Thus an equation of the following 
general form is estimated for blacks and for nonblacks: 
y (5.2) 
where Y is once again equal to the number of months of post-service 
educational attainment, and ~ through Xn denote the variables which 
prove to be stat1st1cally sih'llificant in explaining the observed vari-
atlon in Y among the veterans in eaeh sample group. The suggested 
explanatory variables entered into the regression program for each group 
are the same as those entered into the first regression, with the excep-
tion of the x9 variable which is now eliminated. The expected signs of 
the variable coe ffic:ients remain the same as before. 
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The deletion of non-h:i.gh school ·graduates from the data base, as· 
noted earlier, becomes parti.cularly important now that one seeks to 
determine the relative impact of benefit availability on black and 
non.black investment. The Veterans Administration has for some time 
recognized that the propensity to use available educational benefits is · 
positively associated with prior educational attainment. In their final 
·report on educational assistance to veterans submitted to the Senate 
Connnittee on Veterans Affairs, the Educational Testing Service concluded 
that "educationally disadvantaged Vietnam :Era veterans • participate 
in educational programs at a much lower than average rate" (26, p. IV). 
ln order to avail himself of college educational benefits, the 
veteran must first be a high school graduate. Because blacks, on 
average, have lower prior attainment levels, one .will find a higher. 
proportion of non-graduates from high school among blacks. The inclusion· 
of veterans who are not high school graduates in the present analys~s 
could bias the results regarding the relative effect of benefits on 
blacks and nonblacks by including a relatively high proportion of 
ineligible blacks in the sample. 7 
A comparison of the beta coefficients for the benefit variable 
(entered as x5 in each group) and their significance will enable an 
evaluation of the second hypothesis. In the event the availability of 
benefits proves a significant determinant of post-service attainment. by 
blacks and does not prove a significant determinant for nonblacks, the 
second hypothesis will be accepted. If the availability of benefits 
7It was in order to deal with such bias that O'Neill and Ross 
divided veterans according to prior education and AFQT scores in seeking 
to ascertain relative benefit usage by black and nonblack Vietnam Era 
veterans (17, p. 53). 
proves significant for nonblacks and fails to prove significant for 
blacks, the second hypothesis is rejected. Any other combination of 
significance/nonsignificance with regard to the benefit variable8 will 
' 
necessitate further statistical procedures in order to evaluate the 
second hypothesis. 
8 . 
For example, if benefit availability were to prove a significant 
determinant for both blacks and nonblacks. 
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CHAPTER VI 
EVALUATION 
The initial regression was performed on the data relating to all 
veterans. The most important variable in explaining the variation in 
post-service college attainment was the availability of GI Bill benefits. 
Benefit availability alone explained just 3.74% of the total variation 
in Y. Other explanatory variables which proved to be significant were 
(in order of decreasing importance) the highest year of schooling the I . 
veteran had completed at separation, the veteran's age at separation, 
the gap between the end of pre-service schooling and entry into the 
Armed Forces, and the region where the veteran resides. Details of the 
regression results appear in Table I. 
The beta coefficient is of the expected sign for each variable 
, 
listed. The data indicate that post-service attainment by veterans 
increases significantly when benefits are available, and varies directly 
as well with the level of attainment of the veteran at separation. 1here 
is an inverse relationship.between the dependent variable and age at 
separation, the pre-service schooling/entry gap, and residency in the 
northeast or north central region of the country. 
1he nature of the relationship between Y and each of the variables 
omitted from the equation is determined from the matrix of correlation 
coefficients. With the exception of the marriage variable, the sign of 
the coefficient is as predicted in each case. The relationships, however, 
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TABLE I 
REGRESSION OF MONTHS OF POST-SERVICE ATTAINMENT ON SUGGESTED VARIABLES 
Data Including Data on Black Data on Nonblack 
Variables All Veterans Veterans Only Veterans Only 
Constant -7. 3579 2.6290 -8. 8560 
BNFr 4.6555 9.9164 N.S. 
(6. 8879) a (4.3068) a 
HYSC 1.5934 N .S. 1.4761 
(8.4665) a (7.7730) a 
AGE -0.0241 N. S. -0.0166 
(3.3944) a (2. 3380) a 
GAP -0.4585 N. S. -0.6131 
(2.8549) a (3.8657) a 
RES -1. 4236 N. S. -1.6293 
(2 .4923) a (2. 7667) a 
NMOS N.S. N .S. 0 .0370 
(5.7813) a 
R2 (Adj.) .0761 .1514 .0721 
BNFT = Benefit availability; HYSC = Highest year of schooling completed upon separation; AGE = Age at sepa-
ration; GAP= Gap between end of pre-service. schooling and entry into Armed Forces; RES= Region resided in 
at time of survey; NMOS =Number of months out of service at the time of the survey. "a" indicates sig-
nificance at the 99-% level of probability, "b" indicates significance at the 95% level.·. N.S. means the 
variable did not prove to be a significant determinant at the 95% confidence level. Th.e stepwise regression 
program produces coefficients only for those variables which prove significant determinants at the specified 
level (95%). N = 2316 observations in first regression; N = 106 in second regression; and N = 2210 in 
third. The figures in the parentheses are t-values. 
\J1 
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dld nol prove to be sJgnlficant at the 95% confidence level. The fact 
that the disability variable failed to register as significant is prob-
ably due to the small number of disabled veterans in the survey group. 
The lack of significant association between the number of months of post-
service attainment and the number of months out of service may lend some 
support to the proposition that veterans will tend to acquire the bulk 
of their post-service attainment soon after separation (within two to 
three years). Such a conclusion would be consistent with economic theory 
as the rate of return on investment declines as the time over which 
earnings can accrue decreases. 
The insignificance of the racial variable may partially reflect the 
relatively strong influence of GI Bill availab::t.l:ilty (to Korean veterans) 
in offsetting the otherwise negative association between post-service 
attainment and the fact that a veteran is black. As predicted, benefit 
availability was not a strong enough influence to change the negative 
correlation, though it was expected to be sufficient to reduce the sig-
nificance of that (still negative) association. 'Ihe fact that black 
veterans comprised a small percentage of the total sample population 
(4.5%) may also have served to restrict the aignificance of the r~cial 
variable. 
Perhaps the most interest:.'..ng of the variables which failed to prove 
significant is marital status. The sign of the coefficient (positive) 
was the opposite of that hypothesized, though the variable failed to 
register as a s Lgnificant determinant at the 95% confidence level. It 
is conceivable that as more women enter the labor force marriage actually 
in·~reases the veteran's capacity for financing additional education. The 
lack of signiflcance either way makes it impossibl~ to draw definitive 
conclusions from these results. It can be said that the rationale 
(previously developed) that a GI Bill was t'.esirable because veterans 
hav:ing families to support face particular financial difficulties was 
not necessarily valid in the late 1950' s and early 1960' s. 
.55 
Separate regressions were run on black veterans, and on nonblack 
veterans. The details of these regressions are also recorded in Table I. 
Among black veterans, the only variable which proved to be a signifi~~nt 
determinant of post-service educational attainment was the availability 
. of GI Bill benefits. Benefit availability explained 15.14% of the 
variation in the dependent variable. 
Among nonblack veterans, btmefit availability was not a significant 
determinant of post-service attainment. Those variables which did prove 
to be significant at the 95% confidence level were, in order of import-
ance, the number of months since separation from the service, the highest 
year of schooling completed at separation, the gap between completion 
of. pre-service schooling and entry into the Armed Forces, the regi9n of 
residence, and age at separation. All variables have coefficients of the 
expected sign. 
The most. important results to be derived from the regressions on 
black and nonblack veterans are (1) the highly significant role of 
benefit availability ln black veteran educational investment decisions 
and (2) the insignificance of GI Bill benefits as a determinant of 
nonblack veteran investment. These results lend direct support to the 
hypothesis that GI Bill benefits have produced a greater increase in 
post-service collei~e attainment for black veterans than for nonblack 
veterans. Thus the influence of benefit availability appears to occur 
mainly through its role in reducing the financing costs for veterans 
from relatively disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds. 
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11 IH true thnt "tho ruto of partlelpatlon (under the <:T Bill) 
among black veterans is substantially below that of white veterans and 
the overall participation rate" (26, p. 5) as critics of the program 
claim. Much of the differential in participation can be attributed to 
differences in prior educational attainment as O'Neill and Ross have 
1 
shown. Even after correcting for such differences in prior attainment, 
one would still expect a relatively high optimal level of investment for 
nonblack veterans due to the effects of discrimination and differences 
in financing costs when GI Bill benefits are not in force. Though benefit 
availability produces a relatively large shift of the supply function 
for black veterans .in our model, one would not necessarily expect the 
difference in supply function shifts between blaaks and nonblacks to be 
large enough to push the optimal amount of investment for a black veteran 
2 
up to the optimal level for a nonblack veteran. 
The point of the analysis at hand is that the increase in the 
optimal amount of investment resulting from the availability of benefits 
will be greater for blacks than nonblacks when at least high school 
equivalency has been achieved. This will be partially reflected by a 
relatively large increase in post-service participation by blacks when 
benefits are available. The survey data reveals that only 24.19% of the 
black veterans ineligible for benefits attended college during the survey 
period, while 43.18% of black veterans eligible for benefits attended. 
1 For a synopsi.s of the O'Neill and Ross findings, see Chapter II, 
pp. 13-14. 
:l In terms of the theoretical model (see Figure 3, Chapter IV), the 
availability of benefits would actually need to shift the supply function 
for black veterans beyond and to the right of the supply function for 
nonblacks in order to offset the differences in the demand functions and 
result in an equal optimal level of investment for blacks and nonblacks. 
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Among nonblack veterans, those without benefits participated at a 20 .57% 
rate, while participation among those with benefits was 34.68%. 
One would also expect the difference in the impact of benefit 
availability will be reflected in figures indicating the average amount 
of at talnment for black and nonblack veterans with and without benefits. 
On this point, the data reveal that the average attainment among black 
veterans who acquired any post-service education was 157% higher for 
those with benefits than for those without. Among nonblack veterans, 
those with benefits attended (on average) 33.5% longer than those without 
benefits. 3 
The fact that the number of months out of service was a strongly 
significant explanatory variable for nonblacks b4t insignificant in the 
regression performed on all veterans may be duein part to intercorrela-
t1on between this variable and the availability of benefits variable. 
Veterans with benefits will tend to have been out of the service-longer 
at the time of the survey. l t was partly in order to deal with such 
correlation among the explanatory variables that the stepwise regression 
technique was employed. 
ln otder to further pinpoint the influence of benefit availability 
by reducing the influence of months out of service, additional regressions 
3 Among black veterans, those without benefits attended an average of 
10 .5 months while those with benefits averaged 27 months of attainment. 
Among nonblack veterans, attendance averaged 21 months among thof?e without 
benefits and 27.9 mortths for those with benefits. The fact that within 
the survey group black veterans attended in greater proportion and for 
approximately the same average duration as nonblack veterans when benefits 
were available closely parallels the results obtained by O'Neill and Ross. 
Their correction for prior educational attainment led to their findings 
that with regard to benefit usage "black veterans participate more than 
nonblack veterans within every AFQT/prior education cell ••• and utilize 
more entitlement per participant than similar nonblack veterans." See 
reference (17, pp. 55-57). 
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were performed on a subsample population consisting only of veteraris 
who were out of the service at least three years at the time of the 
survey. One regression was run on all veterans so classified, and 
separate regressions were run on black veterans and on nonblack veterans 
so classified. The results of these regressions appear in Table IL 
The regression results in Table II are similar to those obtained 
from the first regressions (Table I) with two exceptions. First, benefit 
availability has supplanted the number of months out of service as a 
significant explanatory variable among nonblacks. However, it should be 
noted that the addition of benefit availability only adds .53% to the 
explanatory value of the equation for nonblack veterans. Thus the 
results do not appear to contradict the hypothesis that benefit avail-
ability is a more important determinant of investment for black veterans 
than for nonblack veterans. 
The second factor of note emerging from this set of regressions is 
the appearance of the marriage variable in the equation estimated for 
blacks. It is especially interesting because of the positive nature of 
the relationship. This lends some support for the previously discussed 
premise that marriage actually increases the ability of veterans to 
finance further education. 
No attempt was made in the regressions thus far to differentiate 
between full time and part time attendance in calculating the number of 
months of post-service attainment. 'llle survey data were not collected 
and recorded in a manner which allows a breakdown of attainment by number 
of months of full time attendance and number of months of part time 
attendance. A potential problem arises in the analysis if the breakdown 
of total attainment between full tiine and part time attendance is not 
TABLE II 
RESULTS OF REGRESSIONS PERFORNED ON VETERA~S SEPARATED A MINIMUM OF 'lllREE YEARS 
Data Including Data on Black Data on Nonblack 
Variables All Veterans Veterans Only Veterans Only 
Constant -6.3793 .... s. 5355 -5.9596 
BNFT 3.5147 11. 3807 3 .1049 
(4.2082) a (4.2229) a (3.5970) a 
HYSC 1.6748 N.S. 1. 6629 
(7 .3488) a (7 .1338) a 
AGE -0.0264 N.S. -0.0258 
(2 .9011) a (2. 8043) a 
GAP -0.5143 N.S. -0.5674 
(2 .5988) a (2. 7814) a 
RES -1. 7628 N. S. -1. 9708 
(2.5299) a (2. 7471) a 
MRRD N .S. 11.2319 N.S. 
(2 .4799) a 
R2 (Adj.) .0543 .2038 .0522 
BNFI' =Benefit availability; HYSC =Highest year of schooling completed upon separation; AGE = Age at sepa-
ration; GAP = Gap between end of pre-service schooling and entry into Armed Forces; RES = Region resided in 
at time of survey; MRRD = Married at time of survey. "a" indicates significance at the 99% level of prob-_ 
ability, "b" indicates significance at the 95% level. N.S. means the variable did not prove to be a sig-
nificant determinant at the 95% confidence level.· The stepwise regression program produces coefficients 
only for those variables which prove significant determinants at the specified level (95%). N = 1857 
observations in first regression; N = 82 in second regression; and N = 1775 in third. The figures in the 
parentheses are t~values. 
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roughly proportionate betwcrm vott'rnns with benefits and veterans without 
bencf-lts. 
It is possible to deal with this potential problem by restricting 
the dependent variable to include only those months attained by veterarts 
who attended college on a full time basis only. The dependent variable 
is then computed in a manner which excludes (1) all part time months o.f 
attainment and (2) all full time months of attainment by all veterans 
who ever attended part time. A regression was run on all veterans in 
the sample group with the dependent variable restricted to include only 
those months obtained by veterans who never attended college on a part 
time basis. Separate regressions were run on black veterans only, and 
on nonblack veterans only with the d~pendent vari.iable restricted :in the 
same manner. The results of these regressions appear in Table I!I. 
The only noteworthy variation between these results ahd those 
obtained from the first set of regressions (Table I) is the replacement 
of benefit availability as an explanatory variable by number of months 
out of service in the regression performed on all veterans (blacks and 
nonblacks). It would be erroneous to conclude from this additional 
information that benefit availability was an insignificant determinant 
among the veterans in the sample. Rather, these results illustrate a 
continuing pattern among all regression sets: the highly significant 
impact of benefit availability for black veteran investment, and the 
insignificance or near insignificance of benefit availability as a 
determinant of nonblack investment. Because black veterans constitute 
such a small percentage of the sample population, benefit availability 
explains a much smaller percentage of the variation among the total 
population than it does among the black subpopulation. 
TABLE III 
REGRESSION RESULTS WITH DEPENDENT VARIABLE RESTRICTED TO ATTENDA.~CE BY FULL TIME STUDENTS 
Data Including Data on Black Data on Nonblack 
Variables All Veterans Veterans Only Veterans Only 
Constant -4. 3098 1. 3065 -4.3147 
BNFT N. S. 8. 4208 N. S. 
(4.0258) a 
HYSC 1.0171 N.S. 1.0263 
(6.4414) a (6. 3785) a 
AGE -0.0178 - N .S. -0.0172 
(3.0169) a (2 .866 7) a 
GAP -0.3838 N.S. -0.4057 
(2.9569) a (3.0481) a 
RES -1.3605 N. S. -1.5059 
(2. 8261) a (3.0484) a 
Nt-K>S 0.0265 N. S. 0.0246 
(5.0962) a (4.5556) a 
R2 (Adj.) ~0511 .1348 .0507 
BNFT = Benefit availability; HYSC = Highest year of schooling completed upon separation; AGE = Age at sepa-
ration; GAP = Gap between end of pre-service schooling and entry into Armed Forces; RES = Region resided in 
at time of survey; NIDS = Number of months out of service at time of survey. "a" indicates significance at 
the 99% level of probability, "b" indicates significance at the 95% level. N. S. means the variable did not 
prove to be a significant determinant a.t the 95% confidence level. The stepwise regression program produces 
coefficients only for those variables which prove significant determinants at the specified level -(95%). 
N = 2316 observations in first regression; N = 106 in second regression; and N = 2210 in third. The figures 
in the parentheses are t-values. 
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It is imperative that one be mindful of factors aside from those 
specifically included in the regressions which may tend to bias the 
results. The most obvious of these outside factors relates to variations 
in economic conditions during the period under consideration. The 
majority of those veterans eligible for GI Bill benefits (Korean 
Veterans) separated from the service at a time when unemployment was 
1 . ' l'' ·1 · 4 re ative y ow. Thus the opportunity cost of post-service education 
was comparatively high. Conversely, the majority of those veterans 
without benefits (post-Korean) separated in the late 1950's and early 
1960 's when unemployment ran as high as 6 .5% (10, p. 62). Consequently, 
their opportunity costs associated with post-service education ware 
relatively low. Therefore, the economic climate over the survey period 
I , 
tended to favor investment by those without benefits and this would lead 
to some underestimation of the influence of benefit availability. The 
impact of the variation in economic conditions has, however, been largely 
taken into account through the inclusion of the explanatory variable 
relating to the number of months the veteran had been out of service at 
the time of the survey. Any further attempt to incorporate some measure 
of variation in economic conditions into the regression would not appre-
ciably alter the results. 
A second factor tending to influence post-service attainment by 
veterans was the continuing trend toward more education among the entire · 
U. S. population during the survey period. A 1973 study by the Veterans 
Administration found that veteran use of the GI Bill for college education 
4 Unemployment averaged 3% throughout the Korean Conflict and remained 
below 4.5% through September, 1957. See reference (10, pp. 60-62). 
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had not kept pace wl th thf• 1 ncreas:lng enrollment in higher education by 
the general population (26, p. 143) as shown by Figure 6. However, if 
bne were to include veterans' college attainment acquired without benefit 
of the GI Bill, the trend among veterans would possibly approximate that 
of the general population more closely. 
There was certainly a trend toward more education during the survey 
period, both among veterans and the general population. Any such trend 
among veterans could again lead to an underestimation of the impact of 
benefit availability as the most recent group of veterans were those 
without benefits. In an attempt to restrict this particular source of 
potential bias, a regression was performed on veterans who were of the 
same approximate age (31 to 36) at the time of t1'e survey. Once again, 
separate regressions were also run on black veterans and nonblack 
veterans who fell within this age cohort. 
The results of these regressions were not conclusive. For example, 
in the regression run on black veterans none of the explanatory variables 
proved significant at the 95% confidence level. This can probably be 
attributed to the small number of cases in the subsample. The reader 
will recall that in each of the prior regressions the age of the veteran 
at separation was included as a suggested explanatory variable~ There- · 
fore, the influence of the trend toward more education will be partially 
accounted for in each of these other regressions. 
Perhaps the most important source of downward bias regarding the 
impact of benefit availability on post-service attainment stem;; from an 
overlap between the time that benefits became available for post-Korean 
veterans under the Vietnam Era GI Bill (June 1, 1966), and the time of 
the survey (March 15, 1967). In the earlier regressions, the dependent 
VETERANS USE OF G.I. Bill FOR COLLEGE EDUCATION 
AND GENERAL ENROLLMENT IN COLLEGE 
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Source: Reference (26, p, 147). 
Figure 6. Veterans Use of GI Bill for College Education and 
General Enrollment in College 
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varlab.le for post-Korean veterans contains all education acquired by them 
during the survey period, including that obtained between June 1966 and 
March 1967. Thus there were included in the dependent variable for post-
Korean veterans months of attainment they might not have acquired without 
the Vietnam Era GI Bill. Therefore the original regressions may well 
underestimate the impact of benefit availability because one overestimates 
the months of attainment by those without benefits (post-Koreans). 
It is impossible to remove this source of downward bias. One can, 
however, manipulate the data to reverse the direction of the bias. This 
is accomplished by assuming that all of the months of attainment by post-
Korean veterans after May 1966 with Veterans Administration assistance 
were due to the availability of benefits under tqe Vietnam Era Bill. 
Therefore, in the absence of the Vietnam Bill these same months of 
attainment would sum to zero. 
When the educational attainment by post-Korean veterans with GI Bill 
benefits is assumed to be zero, an underestimation of what their educa-
tional attainment during the survey period would have been without the 
Vietnam Era Bill is obtained. By underestimating the attainment of 
those without benefits, one overestimates the influence of benefit avail-
ability on post-service investment. The regression results obtained when 
post-Korean attainment ls so underestimated are recorded in Table IV. 
Once again additional regressions were run separately on black veterans 
and nonblack veterans employing the same criteria. 
The results of these~ regressions exhibit very little variation from 
those obtained ln the initial regressions (Table I). It appears that 
only a few of the nonblack veterans in the survey availed themselves of 
benefits under the Vietnam Era Bill during the survey period. There 
TABLE IV 
REGRESSION RESULTS WI'lli DEPENDENT VARIABLE BIASED TO FAVOR SIGNIFICANCE 
Data Including Data on Black Data on Nonblack 
Variables All Veterans Veterans Only Veterans Only 
Constant -7. 3579 2.6290 -9.2525 
BNFT 4.6555 9. 9164 N.S. 
(6.8879) a (4. 3068) a 
HYSC 1.5934 N.S. 1. 4939 
(8.4665) a (7. 7848) 
AGE -0.0241 N. S. -0.0162 
(3.3944) a (2.2817) a 
GAP -0. 4585 N. S. -0. 6087 
(2. 8549) a (3. 8355) a 
RES -1. 4236 N.S. -1.6193 
(2.4923) a (2. 7488) a 
N~S N .S. N. S. 0.0373 
(5.8281) a 
R2 (Adj.) .0761 .1514 .0722 
BNFT =Benefit availability; HYSC =Highest year of schooling completed upon separation; AGE = Age at sepa-
ration; GAP = Gap between end of pre-service schooling and entry inte> Armed Forces; RES = Region resided in 
at . time of survey; NMOS '"' Number of months out of service ·at the time of the survey. "a" indicates sig-
nificance at the 99% level of probability, "b" indicates significance at the 95% level. N.S. means the 
variable did not prove to be a significant determinant at the 95% confidence level. The stepwise regression 
program produces coefficients only for those variables which prove significant detei"minants at the specified 
level {95%). · N = 2316 observations in first regression; N = 106 in second regressi.on; and N = 2210 in 
-third. The figures in parentheses are t-values. 
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w:111. II ti. lt.\ tlme for tlu.•Hl' poHt-Korean v1~ttir11m1 to hecome aware of the 
new program, complete all the certification requirements, and actually 
begin taking classes. There fore, the impact of the Vietnam Era Bill on 
investment decisions by those veterans in the survey group was minute. 
Benefit availability continues to register as a significant determinant 
for the total sample population and for the black subpopulation. The 
availability of benefits again fails to prove a significant determinant 
of nonblack investment. 
QIAPTER VII 
CON CL US IONS 
This study is not intended to serve as an evaluation of the Gt Bill, 
the merits of which should not be judged on the basis of educational 
I 1 outcomes a one. The study does serve as a test of several tenets 
derived from human capital theory. The following conclusions may be 
drawn: 
(1) The GI Bill has :i.ncreased somewhat the '1mount of college 
education acquired by the veteran population. What is especially 
interesting is that the availability of benefits is capable of explaining 
at most 3.74% of the variation in post-service college attainment among 
all veterans surveyed. The average veteran with benefits acquired .S. 56 
months more post-service education than his counterpart without benefits. 
While one cannot specify how much of that differential is due to benefit 
2 
availability, it appears to be well below previous estimates. There is 
a need for caution to be applied in interpreting these results. It does 
appear, however, that earlier studies based on hypothetical questions 
1 A true evaluation would be based upon the impact of the bill on 
veterans earnings. This would include not only the effect on earnings of 
college attainment resulting from benefit availability, but also the 
effects of vocational and correspondence training taken as a result of 
benefit availability. 
2 Prior estimates by R. J. Strom and by Frederiksen and Schrader 
(see Chapter II, p. 7) were in the area of a 20% differential on actual 
investment, or 1.96 months. 
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posed to WWII veterans at tribute a greater impact to the influence of 
benefit availabiiity for that group than was true in the case of Korean 
veterans. It is recognized that prior studies by Strom (20) and by 
Frederiksen and Schrader (5) were conducted on a group of veterans who 
served at a different time and under a different GI Bill from those in 
the present survey. Nonetheless, it seems that the impact of GI Bill 
benef:i.t:s on college investment decisions by veterans has been cons'ider-
ably less than was heretofore believed. 
(2) The GI Bill has been highly significant for black veterans in 
their attempts to acquire college education following separation. nie 
regression: results indicate that the availability of benefits explains a 
minimum of 15.14% of the variation in college· at~ainment by black 
. . 
veterans. 3 Alllong black veterans without benefits, the post-service 
attainment per individual in the sample was 2.54 months. 'lhe average 
post-se.rvice attainment for black veterans with benefits was 11. 66. months. 
1l1e importance of benefit availability to black veteran investment is due 
::...n large part to the difficulty these individuals have in financing such 
investment .when benefits are not available. 
(3) Benefit availability has been relatively unimportant in the 
college in yes tment decisions of nonblack veterans. The main regression 
results indicate that the effect of benefit availability on this group 
is. in fact. insignificant. One cannot, however, positively state that 
31 t is recognized that in the regression restricting the dependent 
. variable to> exclude all months by any individuals who ever attended otl\er 
than full time (Table III)• the R2 for benefit availability among black 
veterans is .1348. However. it is felt that the restriction imposed On. 
the calculat.ioo of the dependent variable may have acted to bias the 
results for black veterans. It should be noted that only 17 blacks in 
the sample attended college on a full time basis only. 
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the impact is insignificant for nonblacks due to the results obtained 
when the dependent variable was restricted to include only attainment by 
veterans who were separated at least three years p.rior to the date of the 
survey (see Table II). 1be evidence does clearly show that the impact of 
benefit availability is far less for nonblacks than it is for blacks, and 
considerably less for the veteran population as a whole than connnonly 
believed. 
The results have important implications for present government 
policy. 1be recent decisiqn to phase out the current GI Bill will not 
lead to the drastic decline in college enrollment that some had fearE:d. 4 
'Ihe present declining enrollment must instead be largely attributed to 
other factors such as the end of the military draft, a declining college 
age population, and changing attitudes regarding .the worth of a college 
education. 
Ceteris paribus, the elimination of benefits as presently constituted 
will i.mpose particular hardship upon black veterans as they seek to 
improve thelr relative socioeconomic status through further education. 
TI1e decision to phase out the Vietnam Era program becomes effective at 
a time whe~ blacks comprise a rapidly increasing proportion of military 
servicemen (future veterans). The evidence suggests that a continuation 
of the Vietnam Era GI Bill would be highly effective in facilitating 
college education for a large number of Americans from socioeconomically 
. . 5 
disadvantaged backgrounds. 
4n1ere will be far fewer veterans in college, but this is due mainly 
to the declining number of individuals being separated from the service. 
5 On April 30, 1976, there were 178,283 veterans in training under 
the Vietnam Era GI Bill who were educationally disadvantaged at the time 
they entered training (had not completed high school). Of these, 89,375 
were trained in college. See reference (27, p. 20). 
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The success of emerging programs designed to encourage savings for 
education by servicemen through matching government grants is tmcertain. 
tlie phasing out of the current GI Bill surely removes a primary incentive 
for socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals to enter the service. 
This makes it necessary for the military to offer other inducements 
(e.g., higher pay) to secure necessary manpower. Any substitution of 
greater cash benefits for other "tied" or "in kind" benefits will leave 
the determination of the consumption mix in the hands of the individual 
veteran. Whether or not the socioeconomically disadvantaged veteran's 
welfare is enhanced as a result of such substitution depends upon the 
ratio at which cash benefits are offered in place of other "noncash" 
benefits. 
Greater certainty can be attached to the probable impact of the 
Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOG) program as a result of this 
6 
study. 'llle regressions indicate that a program which reduces the 
financing costs of acquiring college level education will significantly 
increase the attainment of individuals from disadvantaged socioeconomic 
backgrounds. 7 It is tmlikely that the extension of BEOG eligibility to 
higher income groups will significantly alter the amount of education 
that they acquire. Rather the thrust of the program will be to increase 
the optimal amotmt of investment for those individuals from relatively 
6nie annual federal budget for BEOG's is about $2.44 billion. See 
reference (22, p. 5). 
7 An important feature of the BEOG gr an ts is that they are available 
to both the veteran and nonveteran population. 'lllerefore, it is likely 
that in the long run they will prove to be even more important than the 
GI Bill in increasing the educational attainment of individuals from 
disadvantaged backgrounds. 
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disadvantaged backgrounds up toward the optimal amount of investment for 
. individuals from relatively advantaged backgrounds. Thus the BEOG pro-
gram can be expected to improve the absolute and relative educational 
attainment status of individuals evolving from socioeconomically 
disadvantaged backgrounds. 
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APPENDIX A 
COMPARISON OF CUMULATIVE PARTICIPATION 
RATES UNDER THREE GI BILLS 
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TABLE V 
COMPARrSON OF CUMULATIVE PARI'ICIPATION RATES UNDER THREE GI BILLS 
Total Nunber of Veterans Who Received Benefits 
for Training Under the Provisions of a 
GI Bill 
Cumulative Participation Rate as a Percentage 
of Those Veterans Eligible for Benefits 
Total Number of Veterans Who Received Benefits 
for College Training under the Provisions of 
a GI Bill 
Cumulative College Participation Rate as a 
Percentage of 'lhose Veterans Eligible for 
Benefits 
Source: Compiled from reference (27, p. 19). 
WWII 
Veterans 
7,800,000 
50.5% 
2,200,000 
14.4% 
Korean 
Veterans 
2, 391,000 
43.4% 
1,200,000 
22.0% 
Pos t-ICorean 
Veterans 
5'797'143 
63.6% 
3,700,000 
36 .1% 
..... 
00 
APPENDIX B 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN THE 
196 7 SURVEY OF VETERANS 
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'111e information contained in the following pages. is taken from the 
survey sent to a random sample of veterans in 1967. For the ease of 
reading, graphical notation such as boxes and blanks have been omitted 
in this cdntext. All questions are direct duplicates of those found 
in the original questionnaire. 
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Official Letterhead. 
Dear Sir: 
We have not yet received the qq.estionnaire sent to you several days 
ago in .connection with a survey we are making for the Veterans Administra'."" 
tion ., The .. results of this survey will be used to review Government 
programs which affect veterans and their families and to find ways in 
which these programs might be improved. You are one of. several thousand 
veterans iielected at random for inclusion in this survey. As noted in 
our earlier letter, this survey is based on a small sample of total 
veteran population, and it is important that every questionnaire be 
completed and returned. 
Your answers will be treated as confidential by the Bureau of the 
Census and the Veterans Administration and will be used for statistical 
purposes only. 
I 
The questionnaire is divided into two sections: 
Section A should be completed by ALL veterans 
Section B should be completed by World War II and Korean Conflict 
veterans and veterans who entered the Armed Forces after January 31, 
1955. 
If you have already completed and mailed your questionnaire, please 
disregard this letter and accept our thanks for your cooperation. lf ·' · 
not, please complete the appropriate section(s) of this questionnaire 
and mail it within three days in the enclosed envelope which requires 
l}.O postage. 
Thank you for your assistance in making this survey a success. 
Sincerely yours, 
(Signed) 
A. Ross Eckler 
Director 
Bureau of the Census 
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Section A: TO BE FILLED IN BY ALL VETERANS 
Please answer each question as accurately as possible. If you do not 
have exact information, enter your best estimate. If you cannot recall 
some af the information asked for and have no records from which to 
obtain it, write "Don't Know" in the answer space. ANSWER EVERY,QUESTION, 
unless the ·instructions tell you to skip the question. 
1. When were you born? (Month, Day, Year) 
2. Check each period in which you served on active duty in the U. S. 
Armed Forces. 
1. Before World War I (before April 6, 1917) 
2. World War l (April 6, 1917-November 11, 1918, or April 2, 1920, 
if served in Russia) 
3. Between World Wars I and II (November 12, 1918-September 15, 1940) 
4. World War II: Check each period in which you served: 
1. · September 16, 1940-December 6, 1941 
2. Decenber 7, 1941-Deceni>er 31, 1946 
3. January 1, 1947-July 25, 1947 
5. Between World War II And Korean Conflict (July 26, 1947-
June 26, 1950) 
6• Korean Conflict (June 27, 1950-January 31, 1955) 
7. After the Korean Conflict (After January 31, 1955) ·[Answer 2a 
through h] 
If you checked 1. through 6. ONLY, go to 3a; if you checked 7., go 
to 2a. 
2a. When did you (first) enter the Armed Forces? (Month, Day, Year) 
b. How did you (first) enter the Armed Forces? 
1. Enlisted for years 
2. Selective Service induction (drafted) 
3. Volunteered for Selective Service induction 
4. Reserve or National Guard trainee for months 
5. Other (Explain) 
c. Have you been awarded the Viet "Nam Service Medal,. the Viet Nam 
Comba~ award, or the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal for service 
in Viet Nam? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
d. Have you been awarded the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal for 
service some place other than Viet Nam? 
1. Yes--for service in -----
2. No 
e. What was your pay grade when you were (last) separated from.active 
duty in the Armed Forces? (For example: E-2; E-5; 0-3; W-2) 
f. What military occupation did you have for the longest time while you 
were in the Armed Forces? (Enter specialty title, or rating, or 
officer designator and check branch of service.) 
1. Army 4 • Marine Corps 
2. Navy 5. Coast Guard 
3. Air Force 
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g. How long after you stopped going to school did you (first) e·nter the 
Armed Forces? 
Years' or months or weeks 
h. What were you doing in the three months before you (first) entered 
the Armed Forces? (Check as many as applicable.) 
3a. 
b. 
4a. 
b. 
c. 
Sa. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
1. G~ing to school 
2. Working: Full time Part time 
3. Looking for work 
4. Something else--Explain 
Were you in the Armed Forces five years ago, that is, on March 15, 
1962, on regular (not Reserve or: National Guard training) actiye 
duty? 
1.. Yes--Skip to 4a 
2. No 
Where were you living on March lS, 1962? (If you were on tr~ining 
duty,· where was your home when you entered service for training?) 
1. In this county 
2. In this State but a different county 
3. In a different State 
4. Not in the U.S. 
Were you in the Armed Forces one year ago, that is, on March lS, 
1966, on regular (not Reserve or National Guard training) active 
duty? 
1. Yes-~Skip to Sa 
2. No 
Where were you living on March 15, 1966? (If you were on training 
duty, where was your home when you entered service for training?) 
L In this county . . } Ski 5 
2. In this State but a different county P to a 
3. I_n a different State } G 
o to c 4. Not in the U. S. 
. _ .. ~ 
Why did you leave that State or country? 
1. Transferred by my employer 
2. A better job, business, or professional opportunity in another 
State (or in the U. S., if you were in another country) 
3. For my or my family's health 
4. Tp go to school 
S. ~ved away when I retired 
6. Other reason--Explain 
Are you retired from ~he Armed Forces? 
1. No--Skip to 6 
2. Yes, as a 3. Reserve 
4. Regular member of the Armed Forces 
Were you retired for: 
1. Disability? 
2. Some other reason (years of service, age, etc.)? 
When were you retired? Month, year 
Are you entitled to Armed Forces retirement pay? 
1. No--Skip to 6 
2. Yes 
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e. Have you waived any or all of your retirement pay? 
1. None 
2. Part 
3. All 
6. Do you have a Disability or Medical discharge from the Armed Forces? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
7. Do you have a disability which has been rated as service-connected by 
the Veterans Administration? 
1. No--Skip to 8 
2. Yes, I have a compensation rating for a service-connected 
disability of (0%, 10%, 20%, •.• , 100%) __ % 
8. Do you receive a monthly VA pension for non-service-connected 
disability? 
1. Yes, I started receiving my VA pension in (month/year) 
2. No 
9a. Since March 15, 1966, have you been a patient (stayed overnight or 
longer) in a hospital? 
1. No--Skip to 10 
2. Yes b. How many different times were you hospitalized? 
GIVE THE INFORMATION FOR EACH TIME YOU WERE IN A HOSPITAL 
c. What kind(s) of hospital(s) were you in; how many days; and, when 
did you enter and when did you leave? 
For each time you we re in a hospital, enter: 
Days i.n hospital; Date admitted; Date discharged 
Type of hospital (or patient) (Check one of the following for each 
time you were in a hospital) 
VA Hospital or a VA patient in a non-VA hospital; Armed Forces 
hos pi t;al; Other hospital (public or private, answer d) 
d. Who paid or will pay the hospital and doctor bill(s) each time you 
were in the hospital? 
I paid all; I paid part; Social Security, Medicare paid part; Health 
Insurapce paid all or part; Relatives or friends paid all or part; 
Public Assistance or Welfare paid all or part 
10. Since March 15, 1966, have you applied to the VA for hospitalization 
but not been admitted as a patient? 
1. Ncr-Skip to 11 
2. Yes, I applied in (month/year) but was not admitted as a 
patient because: 
1. My condition was not considered serious enough to require 
hospitalization 
2. Tilere were no beds available 
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3. I withdrew my application rather than sign the statement that I 
cotildn't pay for private hospital care 
4. Other reason--Explain 
11. Since March 15, 1966, have you been a patient in a nursing home or 
some place in which you received nursing care (other than your own 
or a relative's or friend's home)? 
1. No--Skip to 
2. Yes 1. In a VA nursing home or Husing Care Unit 
of a VA hospital for (dates) 
2. As a VA patient, in a nursing home not operated 
by VA for (dates) 
3. Not as a VA patient, in a non-VA nursing home 
for (dates) 
12. What is your Social Security or Railroad Retirement Number? 
13a. In 1966 (not counting time you were on active duty in the Armed 
Forces), in how many different weeks did you work either full or 
part time? (Include paid vacations and sick leave.) 
None -- Skip to 14a 
b. Did you lose any full weeks of work because you were on lay-off 
from a jcb or lost a job? 
1. Yes--how many weeks? 
2. No 
c. Were there any weeks (other than those mentioned above) when you 
spent time trying to find work? 
· 1. Yes--how many weeks? 
2. No 
d. Do the weeks entered in 13a, 13b, and 13c add up to 52? 
1. Yes--Skip to e 
2. No 1. What was the main reason you were not working or 
looking for work during those other weeks? Check one. 
1.. I was sick or disabled and couldn't work. 
2. I was retired. 
3. No suitable jobs were available, wouldn't have 
done any good to look 
4. I was in school 
5. I was in the Armed Forces 
6. Other reason 
e. When you worked, was it usually: 
1. Full time 2. Part time 
f. What was the name of the company, business, organization, or 
individual employer for whom you worked or in which you were self-
employed the longest time in 1966? 
14a. Although you didn't work in 1966 at a civilian job, did you spend 
any time on lay-off from a job or trying to find work? 
1. Yes--how many different weeks? 
(Skip to 14c) 
2. No 
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b. What was the main reason you did not look for work? 
1. I, was sick or disabled and couldn't work. 
2. I was retired. 
3. No suitable jobs were available, wouldn't have don~ any good to 
look. 
4 • I was in school. 
5. !'was in the Armed Forces. 
6. Other reason. 
c. When did you last work (before 1966) at a regular full-time or part-
time job or business? 
Month/year or Never worked--Skip to 16 
1. What was the name of the company, business, organization, or 
individual employer for whom you worked or in which you were 
self-employed when you last worked? 
lSa. What kind of business, industry; or organization was this? (For 
example, TV or radio manufacturer, retail shoe store·, Sta.te 
Employment Service, hospital, church)? 
b. Did you work for: 
1. A private company, business, organization, or individual for 
wages, salary, or commission? 
2. A government agency (Federal, State, county, or local)? 
3. Your own business, professional practice, or farm? 
4. A family business or farm without pay? 
c. What kind of work did you do (for example, electrical engineer, 
salesman, accountant, laboratory technician, minister)? 
16. In 
or 
1. 
2. 
3. 
17. Is 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4• 
s. 
1966, how many different weeks did your wife work either full-
part-time? (Include paid vacations and sick leave.) 
I was not married the entire year of 1966 
She didn 1 t work 
She worked--~ weeks, usually: 4. Full time 5 • Part time 
the place where you live a: 
House which you own or are buying. When did you buy or build 
it? Mon th/year 
House owned by parents, in-laws, other relatives 
House which you rent 
Apartment or flat (include coops and condominiums) 
Other (for example, mobile home or trailer; rooming house) 
18. How many relatives live with you? (Count all persons related to you 
by blood or marriage who usually live in your household, even though 
one or more may be absent while attending school or temporarily away 
working, or vacation, in a hospital or nursing home, etc.) 
Number of relatives or None--Skip to 19 
1. Wife: What is her age? __ _ 
2. My children: How many: Under 6 years old 19-22 years old 
6-13 years old 23 and older 
14-18 years old 
3. Other relatives (for example, father, mother-in-law, sister, 
grandchildren). Number 
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19. In 1966, how much income did you and your wife receive from EACH of 
the following sources? Enter the amount in dollars, or check "None" 
if you or your wife had no income from any particular source--DO NOT 
LEAVE IT BLACK. Check "Yes" or "No" block as applicable in colutnns 
for each income source for you and for your wife. If you were not 
married for the entire year 1966, check here, ~~' and disregard 
the column for reporting income of "Your Wife". 
(Categories for sources of income are:) 
a. Earned Income 
1. Wages or salary (including commissions, bonuses, tips). Do 
not include Armed Forces pay and allowances 
2. Business, profession, or farm net income 
b. VA Payments 
1. Disability benefits 
a. Compensation (service connected) 
1) Present monthly amount is: 
b. Pension (nonservice connected) 
1) Present monthly amount is: 
2. Other VA benefits 
a. Education assistance 
b. Death (Compensation or pension) 
c. Other--specify: 
c. Social Security (or Railroad Retirement) 
d. Armed Forces payments 
1. Active duty pay and allowances (including training) 
2. Retirement pay 
e. Retirement pay 
1. Federal, State, county, local, (Civil Service, teacher, police, 
etc.) 
2. Company or union pension 
f. All other: 
1. Dividends from stocks and bonds, interest on savings, profits 
from sale of owned property, net rental income, and other 
investment income 
2. Public assistance or welfare 
t 
3. Unemployment insurance, workmen's compensation, Armed Forces 
allotment, etc. 
THIS IS THE END OF SECTION "A". 
NOTE: World War II and Korean Conflict veterans and veterans whose Armed 
Forces service started after January 11, 1955, fill in Section B. 
All .. other veterans need not fill in the rest of the questionnaire. 
Please review Section A to make sure you have answered all the 
questions as best you can. Then mail the questionnaire in the 
preaddressed, postage-paid envelope. Thank you for your coopera-
tion and assistance. 
88 
SECTION B -- TO BE FILLED BY WORLD WAR II AND KOREAN CONFLICT VETERANS 
AND VETERANS WHO ENTERED THE ARMED FORCES AFfER JANUARY 31, 
1955. 
20a. What was your Military Service Serial Number? (If you had more 
than one, give the number you had when you were last separated 
from·active duty.) 
b. Was 
1. 
2. 
3. 
6. 
this Service 
Army? 
Navy? 
Air Force? 
Serial Number assigned to you by: 
4. Marine Corps? 
5. Coast Guard? 
Reserve or National Guard organization? Name. 
2la. How long did you serve in the Armed Forces? months or 
(if 6 months or less) -~ days 
b. How much of this service was for Reserve or National Guard training? 
1. None 
2. All 
3. P art--How many man ths __ or weeks __ or days __ 
c. Was all your service (other than for Reserve or National Guard 
training) continuous; that is, without a break in service? 
22. 
1. Yes--When were you separated? (Month/year) 
2. No--When were you first separated? (Month/year) 
When were you last separated? (Month/year) 
What grade or year of school had you FINISHED when you 
ENTERED the Armed Forces? 
1. Elementary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
2. High school 1 2 3 4 
J. College 1 2 3 4 5 6 or more 
first 
23a. While you were in the Armed Forces, did you receive any special 
training or take any courses at special military schools (for 
example, radio, aircraft mechanic, medical corpsman, cooks and 
bakers?) 
1. No--Skip to 24 
2. Yes 
b. Have the skills you acquired through this special training been 
useful to you in your work since you were separated from the Armed 
Forces? 
1. Essential 
2. Quite useful 
3. Fairly useful 
4. Not useful 
5. Have not worked 
24. While you were in the Armed Forces, did you have any regular schooling 
(full time or part time or by correspondence) USAF!, CED, or other, 
by which you earned your high school or college credits or did you 
pass the CED High School Equivalency Test? 
1. No--Skip to 25 
2.. Yes-- Check as many llA 11 re applicable. and enter the number of 
college credits, if any 
3. Passed High School Equivalency Test (CED) 
4. Received high school diploma 
5. Earned high school credits, but not diploma 
6. Earned college credits: semester credits 
~~- quarter credits 
25. What was the highest grade or year of school you had finished or 
had obtained an equivalency certificate for when you were first 
SEPARATED from the Armed Forces? (Circle the highest grade or 
year.) 
1. Elementary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
2. High school 1 2 3 4 
3. College 1 2 3 4 5 6 or more 
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26a. After your Armed Forces service, did you have any counseling and 
guidance to help you make plans for vocational training, education, 
or work? 
1. Yes 
2. No--Skip to 27a 
b. Did the VA arrange for counseling and guidance? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
c. Where did you receive counseling and guidance? (Check as many as 
applicable;) 
1. VA Regional Office or Guidance Center 
2. VA hospital 
3. High school or college 
4. U. S. or State Employment Service 
5. Other--Specify: 
d. In your opinion was the counseling or guidance helpful in making 
plans for education, training or work? 
1. Very helpful 
2. Somewhat helpful 
3. Not helpful 
27a. After your Armed Forces service, did you go to school (high school, 
college, vocational, technical or business school) or take training. 
(on-the-job, on-farm, or apprentice)? 
1. Yes 
2. No--Skip to 28 
b. How long did you go to school or take training? (Answer in months.) 
1. Under the G. I. Bill 
2. Under the VA Vocational Rehabilitation program for service-
disabled veterans 
3. Without VA financial assistance 
1. When did you stop going to school or training without VA 
financial assistance? (Month/year) 
a) Haven' t stopped 
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c. What kintj of schooling or training was it and did you generally go 
to school or train full time or part time? (Check as many as are 
applicable.) 
1. On-the-job training 
2. Apprentice training 
3. Institutional on-farm training 
4. Vocational, technical, or business school 
5. High school 
6. Junior college 
7. College, undergraduate 
8. College, graduate school 
9. College, professional school 
d. Did you FINISH a course of training or schooling and receive a 
certificate of completion or license, a diploma, or degree? 
1. Yes--Check as many as are applicable: 
1. On-the-job 
2. Apprentice 
3. Vocational, technical, or business school 
4. Institutional on-farm training 
5. High school diploma 
6. Junior College, certificate or degree--What kind? 
7. College, undergraduate degree--What kind? 
8. College, graduate degree(s)--What kind?1 
9. College, professional degree(s)--What kind? 
X. No--What was the MAIN reason you didn't finish? 
1. I'm still in training or going to school 
1) When do you expect to finish? (Month/year) 
2. Financial problems 
3. Difficulty with my studies or training 
4. Family problems interfered or didn't leave me enough time 
5. Other reason--Specify: 
28. What is the highest grade or year of school you have finished or 
have an equivalency certificate for now? Circle the highest grade 
or year. 
1. Elementary school l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
2. High school 1 2 3 4 
3. College 1 2 3 4 5 6 or more 
29a. After your Armed Forces service, did you buy or build a house in 
which you lived? Do not count seasonal homes, investment properties, 
etc. 
b. 
1. No--Skip to 30 
2. Yes, I have bought or built home(s), (the first one) 
Did 
1. 
2. 
in year 
you 
No 
Yes 
3. 
4. 
ever get a GI or VA home loan? 
(Check as many as are applicable.) 
For the first home I bought or built 
1) Do you still live in it? 1. Yes 
For the second home I bought or built 
1) Do you still live in it? 1. Yes 
2. No 
2. No 
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30. Do you expect to buy or build a home (whether or not you already own 
or are buying one new) within the next two years? 
1. Yes, I expect to buy it: 
2. Within the next 6 months 
3. Within the next year 
4. Within the next 2 years 
5. No 
END OF SECTION "B". 
NOTE: Please review Sections A and B to make sure you have answered all 
the questions completely and accurately. Then mail the question-
naire in the preaddressed envelope. Thank you for your coopera-
tion and assistance. 
VITA 
Carl Curtis Brown 
Candidate for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Thesis: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE GI BILL EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS: 
A STUDY OF KOREAN AND POST-KOREAN VETERANS 
Major Fleld: Economics 
Biographil:al: 
Personal Data: Born in Kalamazoo, Michigan, December 7, 194 7, the 
son of Rev. and Mrs. Russell' c. Brown. 
Education: Graduated from Clearwater High. Scl).ool, Clearwater, 
Florida, in June, 1965; attended Case Western Reserve Univer-
sity, 1968; received Bachelor of Science degree in Business 
Managernen t from Florida Southern College in May, 1969; 
received the Master of Arts degree in Economics from the 
University of South Florida in December, 1973; completed 
requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Economics 
at Oklahoma State University in July, 1979. 
Professional Experience: Cost Analyst, Honeywell Aerospace, 
1971-72; instructor, University of South Florida, 1973-74; 
part-time instructor, Hillsborough Community College, 1973-74; 
research assistant, Oklahoma State University, 1974-76; 
adjunct instructor, Eckerd College, 1976; research associate, 
Center for Economic Education, University of South Florida, 
1977; adjunct instructor, University of South Florida, 1977; 
instructor, Hiram College, 1977-79. 
Professional Organizations: Beta Gamma Sigma, Omicron Delta 
Epsilon. 
